We have waited for five years since the Dodd-Frank Act became law and we are now seeing consistent movement to finalize several compensation provisions of the law.
Meetings started in October with President Barack Obama gathering the heads of U.S. financial regulators and urging them to finish the Dodd-Frank rules. To date, we have already adopted Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules that include shareholder votes on executive compensation (Section 951 on say-on-pay and so-called golden parachutes), and on independence of compensation committees (Section 952). Remaining Dodd-Frank provisions, designed to regulate behavior encouraged by compensation structures, are Sections 953, 954, and 956. Already, many institutions have implemented more stringent variable pay plans since 2010, with more compensation tied to longer term performance. The current status of the rules is highlighted below.
Pay Versus Performance Disclosure, Section 953(a)
The proposal for section 953(a) is intended to provide compensation information to augment the say-on-pay vote for public companies. The proposal highlights a new form of realized pay versus reported pay as well as a comparison of the company and peer group total shareholder return (TSR) over several years. The proposed disclosure reflects the SEC’s attempt to help shareholders gain a better understanding of how executive pay compares to company performance by comparing named executive officers’ total compensation as described in the summary compensation table to what the SEC is now defining as compensation actually paid. As an example, the vested value of equity will be incorporated into the actually paid definition versus the value of equity at grant date. Also, the new rule uses total shareholder return (TSR) as the performance measure comparing performance to compensation “actually paid,” and using TSR of a company’s peer group to provide additional context for the company’s performance. In addition, companies will be required to provide a clear description of the relationship between the compensation actually paid and cumulative TSR for each of the last five completed fiscal years.
Current Status of Rulemaking: We expect either a final, or re-proposed rule, by fall, 2015.
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Section 953(b)
The SEC finalized this rule in August, 2015, with implementation deferred to fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2017. The rule requires that public companies disclose the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation to the total compensation of all other employees. For example, if the CEO’s compensation was 45 times the median of all other employees, it can be listed as a ratio (1 to 45) or as a narrative. Total compensation for all employees has to be calculated the same way the CEO’s is calculated for the proxy. All employees means all full-time, part-time, temporary and seasonal employees.
Current Status of Rulemaking: The SEC finalized the rule on August 5, 2015. The first disclosure is expected for 2017 fiscal year as shown in proxy statements filed in 2018.
Clawbacks, Section 954
Section 954 is often referred to as the “clawback” provision of Dodd-Frank and applies to all public companies. The proposal requires companies set policies to revoke incentive-based compensation from top executives with a restatement of earnings if the compensation was based on inaccurate financial statements. The company has to take back the amount of compensation above what the executive would have been paid based on the restated financial statements. This rule applies to public company Section 16 officers, generally any executive with policy making powers. Variable compensation that is based upon financial metrics as well as total shareholder return would need to be clawed back, and there is a three year look-back for current and former executives.
Current Status of Rulemaking: Expect final rules in fall, 2015; once final from SEC, stock exchanges will create the listing rule and an effective date (expected late 2016 or early 2017).
Enhanced Compensation Structure Reporting, Section 956
This rule was proposed in April, 2011—more than four years ago. This rule applies to financial institutions, specifically banks greater than $1 billion in assets. The rule is primarily a codification of the principles as found in joint regulatory Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, which stated that compensation needs to be:
Balanced to both risk and reward over a long-term horizon
Compatible with effective controls and risk management, and
Supported by strong corporate governance.
In addition, there is an annual reporting requirement and for large banks (greater than $50 billion in assets), there is a mandatory deferral of incentive pay. Given that there have been four years since the original proposal, we are expecting a number of changes as the global regulatory structures have changed greatly since 2011.
Current Status of Rulemaking: Originally proposed in April 2011, changes are expected to be re-proposed in 2015.