David Luigs
Lee Schneider
Naeha Prakash
Zila Reyes Acosta-Grimes


Lenders-12-9-16.pngThe shift away from the traditional banking model—largely due to technological advances and the growing disaggregation of certain bank services—has contributed to the rise of the marketplace lending (MPL) industry. The MPL industry, in particular, offers consumers and small businesses the means by which to gain greater access to credit in a faster way. MPL, despite its increasing growth, has managed to stay under the radar from regulatory oversight until recently. However, in a short span of time, federal and state regulators—the Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and California Department of Business Oversight, for example—have begun to weigh the benefits and risks of MPL, with the OCC, for example, going so far as to announce its intention to grant special purpose national bank charters to fintech companies.

Given the evolving nature of the industry and its regulation, in this article, we discuss three key issues for MPL participants to consider. First, we discuss the regulatory focus on the third-party lending model. Second, we consider the potential fair lending risks. Third, we focus on considerations related to state usury requirements. We conclude with a few thoughts on what to expect in this changing landscape.

Third-Party Lending Model
The MPL model traditionally operates with three parties: the platform lender, the originating bank and investors purchasing the loans or securities. Based on the reliance on originating banks in the MPL structure, the FDIC, CFPB and others increasingly have considered the risks to banks from these third-party relationships. In particular, regulators appear to be concerned that banks may take on additional risk in these relationships, which are potentially similar to the lending model rejected by a U.S. District Court judge earlier this year when deciding CashCall was the real lender in dispute, not a tribal lender set up in South Dakota. Thus, the FDIC, for example, in its recent Guidance for Managing Third-Party Risk, asks institutions engaged in such third-party relationships to appropriately manage and oversee these third-party lenders before, during and after developing such a relationship. In addition, certain originating banks have also taken to retaining some of the credit risk to mitigate concerns that the MPL may be considered the true lender.

Fair Lending
Another potential area to consider relates to fair lending risks regarding extensions of credit in certain geographical areas, underwriting criteria and loan purchase standards. For example, the potential for fair lending risk may increase particularly with respect to the data collected on borrowers for underwriting purposes, for example, where the use of certain alternative criteria may inadvertently result in a disparate impact to protected classes. In addition, restrictions on lending areas or the types of loans sold to investors similarly could pose such issues.

State Usury Requirements
The recent Second Circuit decision in Madden v. Midland Funding LLC also highlights potential uncertainty regarding the MPL model. In Madden, the Second Circuit determined that a debt collection firm, which had purchased a plaintiff’s charged-off account from a national bank, was not entitled to the benefit of the state usury preemption provisions under the National Bank Act, despite originally being available to the originating national bank. Madden was appealed to the Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. Thus, Madden has the potential to limit the ability for MPL firms to rely on their originating banks to avoid complying with state-by-state interest rate caps, as federal preemption would no longer apply to those loans later transferred to or acquired by such nonbank entities. Further, Madden increases the uncertainty regarding the originated loans that MPL firms may later sell to (or issue securities for) investors. While some lenders have chosen to carve out the Second Circuit (New York, Connecticut and Vermont) for lending and loan sale purposes, there is the continued risk that the decision may set a precedent in other circuits.

Conclusion
Even with the increasing scrutiny of the MPL industry, regulators appear to recognize the benefits of access to credit for borrowers. For example, the OCC, CFPB and the Treasury have indicated that any increase in regulation should be balanced with fostering innovation. This may be a potential signal on the part of regulators to adopt a framework by which financial innovation is incorporated into the traditional banking model. Thus, looking forward, we think the regulatory uncertainty in this space provides the opportunity for MPL participants to take a proactive approach in shaping regulatory policy for the industry.

David Luigs

Lee Schneider

Naeha Prakash

Zila Reyes Acosta-Grimes