Considering a Sale of the Bank? Don’t Forget the Board’s Due Diligence

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due-diligence-5-16-16.pngIn today’s competitive environment, some bank directors may view an acquisition offer from another financial institution as a relief. With directors facing questions of how to gain scale in the face of heightened regulatory scrutiny, increased investor expectations, and general concerns about the future prospects of community banks, a bona fide offer to purchase the bank can change even the most entrenched positions around the board table.

So, how should directors evaluate an offer to sell the bank? A good starting place is to consider the institution’s strategic plan to identify the most meaningful aspects of the offer to the bank’s shareholders. The board can also use the strategic plan to provide a baseline for the institution’s future prospects on an independent basis. With the help of a financial advisor, the board can evaluate the institution’s projected performance should it remain independent and determine what premium to shareholders the purchase offer presents. Not all offers present either the premium or liquidity sought by shareholders, and the board may conclude that continued independent operation will present better opportunities to shareholders.

Once the board has a framework for evaluating the offer, it should consider the financial aspects of the offer. The form of the merger consideration—be it all stock, all cash, or a mix of stock and cash—can dictate the level of due diligence into the business of the buyer that should be conducted by the selling institution.

If the proposed offer consists of primarily cash consideration, the selling institution’s board should focus on the buyer’s ability to fund the transaction at closing. Review of the buyer’s liquidity and capital levels can signal whether regulators may require the buyer to raise additional capital to complete the transaction. Sellers bear considerable risk once a merger agreement is signed and the proposed transaction becomes public. The seller’s customers often think of the announcement as a done deal and the merger also naturally shifts the seller’s attention to integration rather than its business plan, which can benefit the combined company, but affect the seller’s independent results. It is difficult for the seller to mitigate these risks in negotiations, so factoring them into the board’s valuation of a sale offer is the best approach.

When considering a transaction in which a significant portion of the merger consideration is the buyer’s stock, the board has additional diligence responsibilities. First, the board should consider whether the buyer’s stock is publicly traded on a significant exchange or lightly traded on a lesser exchange. As the liquidity of the buyer’s stock decreases, the burden on the seller to understand the buyer’s business and future plans increase, as its shareholders will be “investing” in the combined company, perhaps for a lengthy period of time. The board should also consider if and when there will be opportunities for future shareholder liquidity.

On the other hand, when the seller’s shareholders are receiving an easily-traded stock, both parties will have an interest in mitigating the effects of market fluctuations on the pricing of the transaction. In most cases, a pricing collar, fixing the minimum and maximum amounts of shares to be issued, can allocate market risk between the parties. Such a structure can ensure that a market fluctuation does not cause the seller to lose its premium on sale or make the transaction so costly that it could affect the prospects of the buyer.

In addition to the financial terms of the proposed transaction, the seller’s organizational documents may include language allowing the board to consider a broad range of non-financial matters as part of the evaluation of a proposal. Certain matters, particularly with respect to how the seller’s executives and employees are integrated into the resulting institution and how the buyer’s business plan fits into the seller’s market, can have a significant impact on the success of the transaction. Just as community banking is largely a relationship-based model, the most successful mergers are those that make not only economic sense, but also address the “human element” to maintain key employee and customer relationships. The board can add value by raising these issues with management as part of its discussion of the merger proposal and definitive agreement.

In evaluating an offer to sell, the board is responsible for determining whether the bank’s financial advisors and management have considered a range of relevant items in evaluating an offer, including the offer’s financial terms, execution risks associated with the buyer, and social issues relating to the integration of the transaction. Using the bank’s strategic plan to determine which issues require closer scrutiny can focus the board’s attention on truly meaningful issues that will provide additional value to the institution’s shareholders.

Four Ideas to Engage Millennials as Bank Customers and Investors

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millennials-5-11-16.pngIn my work advising community banks on capital and liquidity issues, one of the more common concerns I encounter is how to deal with a changing shareholder base. As existing shareholders age or pass away, they are bequeathing their stock to children and grandchildren, many of whom have no connection to the bank or no longer live in the same community.

Engaging and retaining these younger shareholders has become a challenge—they might sell the shares at a discounted price or fail to support the bank or subsequent capital raises. After all, as all community banks know: A bank’s best shareholders are its customers. Fortunately, there are a number of things community banks can do now to foster better relationships with the younger generation, including millennials.

1. Embrace the Crowd

The recent adoption of Regulation A+, a provision under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, allows small companies to raise up to $50 million in crowdfunded offerings from non-accredited investors in any 12-month period. Millennials are natural crowdfunding investors. In fact, millennials’ craving for connection and desire to give back to their communities makes them more likely to participate in crowdfunding than more traditional capital raises.

That’s a benefit to community banks that are looking to raise capital under Reg A+. Already, several community banks have filed Reg A+ offerings to either issue shares in connection with a merger/acquisition or to redeem preferred stock issued from the Small Business Lending Fund, or SBLF, program. We’ll be keeping an eye on these offerings to see how they progress.

2. Get Tech Savvy

While most bank directors will remember a time before the Internet and mobile phones, today’s youth were weaned on smartphones. Millennials have seen technology transform and disrupt almost every aspect of their lives, from how they communicate, to how they consume entertainment, to how they bank.

In fact, according to a Viacom Media Networks’ survey, The Millennial Disruption Index, 68 percent of millennials believe that in five years, the way we access money will be totally different. Seventy percent believe that the way we pay for things will be completely different and 33 percent believe they won’t need a bank at all. Eek!

For community banks, that means investing in technology is critical. Online and mobile banking services are no longer optional, they are essential. Also, young and old alike are relying on web sites and electronic delivery of company reports and financial information so they can make investment decisions. To meet that demand, banks on our OTCQX market are providing news, quarterly and annual financial reports, which can be easily accessed via Yahoo! Finance and other financial portals.

Banks that don’t invest in their web presence to ensure their news travels risk being overlooked by millennials researching them online.

3. Invest in Education

Millennials grew up during the recession and are more frugal than the generation before. At the same time, they are more skeptical of traditional authority figures when it comes to managing their finances. All this has a resulted in a certain anxiety around finances. A recent study by Bank of America Corp. and USA Today found 41 percent of millennials are “chronically stressed” about money. Only one-third (34 percent) of millennials feel content about their finances, while many are anxious (2 percent) and overwhelmed (22 percent).

For community banks, that presents a tremendous opportunity for education. Chicago-area Liberty Bank for Savings has held free workshops on reducing student debt, even bringing in a debt specialist. Virginia Beach, Virginia’s Bank @tlantic holds regular “lunch and learn” sessions with guest speakers on everything from first-time home buying to cybersecurity for small businesses.

4. Think Outside the Box

Heads buried in their smartphones and tablets, millennials have gained a reputation that they care only about themselves. But that’s just not true. In truth, millennials care deeply about their local communities and the world around them. They want to know that what they do makes a difference. That presents a significant opportunity for community banks which are already deeply embedded in the communities they serve.

But it also means thinking about your community involvement differently. Instead of simply donating to local organizations, organize events where millennials can get involved. Liberty Bank for Savings partnered with a local news site to sponsor a Saturday night “taco crawl” to five local taco restaurants. Other banks have had success inviting their millennial customers to exclusive events they might not otherwise be able to attend like high-profile fashion shows and sporting events.

Think outside the box and you’ll find other ways to engage today’s youth as customers and shareholders.

Four Reasons Why Waiting to Sell May Be a Bad Idea

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bank-strategy-2-5-16.pngMost community banks have a timeframe for liquidity in mind. Strategic plans for these institutions are often developed with this timeframe as a key consideration, driven by the timing of when the leader of the bank is ready to retire.

We meet with a lot of bank CEOs, and we regularly hear some version of the following: “I’m in my early 60s and will retire by 70, so I’m looking to buy not sell.” When we ask these CEOs to describe their ideal acquisition target, the answer often involves size, market served, operating characteristics and, most importantly, talent. After all, banking is a relationship business and great bankers are needed to build those relationships with customers. Buyers will undoubtedly pay a higher premium for a bank with great talent that still has “fire in the belly.” It is hard to recall a time when a buyer was looking for a tired management team ready to retire. So, it seems ironic that a buyer cites talent as the key component to a desirable acquisition candidate, but that same buyer is planning to wait until retirement to sell. Put differently, they’re planning to sell at the point their bank will become less desirable.

We have highlighted four key items for boards and management teams to consider when evaluating the timing of a liquidity event as part of the strategic planning process: the timing of management succession, likely buyers or merger partners, shareholders and the overall economy and market for community banks.

Management Succession
Timing of management succession is critical to maximize price for shareholders. As referenced above, if the leadership of an organization would like to retire within the next five years, and there isn’t a logical successor as part of senior management, the board should begin evaluating its options. Waiting until the CEO wants to retire may not be the best way to maximize shareholder value.

Likely Buyers/Merger Partners
The banking industry is consolidating, which means fewer sellers and buyers will exist in the future. While there may be a dozen or more banks that would be interested in a good community bank, once price is considered, there may only be one or two banks that are both willing and able to pay the seller’s desired price. These buyers are often looking at multiple targets. Will a buyer be ready to act at the exact time your management is ready to sell? In fact, there are a number of logical reasons that your best buyer may disappear in the future. For example, they could be tied up with other deals or they may have outgrown the target so it no longer “moves the needle” in terms of economic benefit.

Shareholder Pressure
Shareholders of most banks require liquidity at some point. While the timing of liquidity can range from years to decades, it is worthwhile for a bank to understand its shareholders’ liquidity expectations. And liquidity can be provided in many ways, including from other investors, buybacks, listing on a public exchange, or a sale of the whole organization. As time stretches on, pressure for a liquidity event begins to mount on management and, in some cases, a passive investor will become an activist.

Overall Economy and Markets
With the Great Recession fresh in mind, virtually every bank investor is aware the market for bank stocks can go up or down. Before the Great Recession, managers who were typically in their mid-50s to early 60s  raised capital with a strategic plan to provide liquidity through a sale in approximately 10 years, which would correspond with management’s planned retirement age. We visited with a number of bankers in their early 60s from 2005 to 2007 and indicated that the markets and bank valuations were robust and it was an opportune time to pursue a sale. Many of these bankers decided to wait, as they were not quite ready to retire. We all know what happened in the years to follow, and many found themselves working several years beyond their desired retirement age once the market fell out from under them.

Over the past two years, we had very similar conversations with a lot of bankers and once again we see some who are holding out. While bankers and their boards generally can control the timing of when they would like to pursue a deal, the timing of their best buyer(s), the overall market and shareholder concerns are beyond their control. Thorough strategic planning takes all of these issues into account and will produce the best results for all stakeholders.

Five Key Steps to Integration Success

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When it comes to the completion of a merger or acquisition, whether you view the glass as half full or half empty will likely depend on your planned approach to integration. After all, there’s no shortage of statistics on the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions due to post-deal integration issues. And it’s easy to see why. The challenge of integrating the people, processes and technology of two organizations into one is a daunting exercise whose success depends on a variety of factors, many of which can be subtle, yet complex.

Still, such challenges are not deterring bankers from the pursuit. Through November of 2015, there were 306 M&A banking deals. With the December numbers not yet available, we would expect the total for 2015 to be about the same as the total for 2014. And, according to recent KPMG community banking survey, nearly two-thirds of the 100 bank executives surveyed anticipate being involved in a merger or acquisition as either buyer or seller during the next year. Moreover, one out of three of those community bank executives foresee integrating information technology systems as the most difficult integration challenge, followed closely by talent management.

While such challenges are undeniable, directors must play a key role in helping management achieve positive results. These five key steps can help directors guide management in driving a successful integration.

Step 1: Set the Tone at the Top
Prior to signing the deal, establish a set of goals that cascade a vision of the deal into high-level, practical operating objectives for the combined organization. Directors should review and provide input in these operating objectives to ensure they align with the bank’s overall strategy, risk appetite and the strategic rationale for the deal. With a strong set of operating objectives in place, executives can develop guiding principles which clearly define the key fundamentals that stakeholders should follow as they begin the planning phase of the integration.

Step 2: Assess the Integration Plan and Roadmap
An integration plan and roadmap needs to be established early in the deal lifecycle. Anchor the plan with a well-understood methodology and a clear, high-level and continuously monitored timeline that identifies key activities and milestones throughout the course of the integration. Develop an integration playbook that details the governance structure, scope of the work streams and activities in addition to well defined roles and responsibilities. Directors must fully understand the integration plan so they can provide valuable feedback, effectively challenge timelines, and have the requisite knowledge to determine if there is a prudent methodology for each phase of the integration. Key disclosures about the transaction should be reviewed to ensure communications to regulators and shareholders set realistic expectations for closing the deal, converting customers, and capturing synergies.

Step 3: Effectively Challenge and Monitor Synergy Targets
Operating cost and revenue efficiencies are identified as part of the deal model, factored into the valuation, and play a critical role in determining the potential success of a merger. Executive management should establish synergy targets at the line-of-business level to promote accountability. Directors should foster effective challenge of expected synergies and provide oversight of the process for establishing the baseline and tracking performance against targets over the course of the integration.

Step 4: Promote Senior Leadership Involvement and Strong Governance Oversight
The program structure and governance oversight is established during the initial planning phase to control the integration program and drive effective decision making. Executive management should identify an “integration leadership team’’ with sufficient decision-making authority and a combination of merger and operating experience to effectively identify risks, resolve issues and integrate the business. Directors should examine the team’s experience, track progress against goals, and closely monitor key risks to assess management’s ability to execute the integration activities.

Step 5: Evaluate Customer and Employee Impacts and Communication Plans
The objective of customer and employee experience programs is to take a proactive approach to help ensure that significant impacts are identified, analyzed and managed with the goal of minimizing attrition. Integrated and effective communication plans are established to address concerns of customer and employee groups to reduce uncertainty, rumors and resistance to change. Directors should scrutinize customer and employee impacts in an attempt to ensure management has an effective mitigation plan for negative impacts through communication, training and target operating model design. Planning for employee retention should include the identification of critical talent to mitigate risks to the integration while ensuring business continuity.

By taking these five steps, directors can provide management with the guidance and support needed for a successful integration.

Policing Your S Corporation Status: Six Simple Steps

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s-corporation-12-30-15.pngS corporations have an obligation to police their shareholder base to see that all shareholders remain eligible. A common problem S corporations face is making sure that after the subchapter S election is made, it stays effective. When a bank is gearing up to make its S election, attorneys and accountants are typically reviewing shareholder documentation to confirm eligibility. But, after the S election is effective, most banks do not regularly review their shareholders’ list to confirm eligibility. Actions beyond the bankers’ control, such as the death or divorce of a shareholder, can result in an inadvertent termination of the S election. The tax consequences for the company and its shareholders can be disastrous.

Here is a common scenario.  A bank has a shareholder who passes away. The executor, who is much more concerned with administering the estate than protecting the bank’s S election, either transfers the bank shares to an ineligible shareholder, such as a corporation, or does nothing and leaves the shares in the estate. While an estate is an eligible shareholder, an estate does terminate for tax purposes at some point, so as a general rule, shares cannot be held in an estate indefinitely. The executor fails to notify the bank that the shareholder has passed away for several years. Dividend checks continue to be cashed in the name of the deceased shareholder. All the while, the bank is not aware of what has happened

Then, sometimes years later, something raises the issue. For example, the executor may finally contact the bank to effect the transfer of the shares, or a new review of the bank’s shareholder list may raise questions about why an estate is still a shareholder. Only then does the bank realize that the shareholder’s will transferred the shares to a corporation or that the shares have been sitting in the estate for many years. As a result, the S election has been compromised.

The good news is that the IRS has a program in place for S corporations to request relief for inadvertent terminations. However, consent of 100 percent of the S corporation shareholders is required, along with a filing to the IRS and a substantial filing fee.

It can be time consuming to obtain the requested relief from the IRS, but going through the process is essential if there has been an inadvertent termination. However, through the suggestions below, bankers may be able to avoid the inadvertent termination in the first place, which is obviously preferable:

  1. Review shareholders’ list: The bank should conduct a detailed review of the list of shareholders at least annually to confirm all shareholders are eligible. In addition, every two years, the bank’s accountants or attorneys should conduct a detailed review of the list.
  2. Review the shareholders’ agreement: Most S corporations have a shareholders’ agreement in place to protect the S election. If the shareholders’ agreement was drafted several years ago, an attorney should review it to confirm that the agreement is up to date with current law. In addition, the agreement should contain protections in the event the S election is inadvertently terminated, such as shareholder indemnification of the expenses incurred in connection with obtaining relief for the inadvertent termination and a covenant by the shareholders to take all steps necessary to remedy the inadvertent termination. There are other provisions that are useful as well.
  3. Shareholder communication: On an annual basis, banks should send a certification to each shareholder to confirm the shareholder still qualifies as an eligible shareholder. This annual certification requirement can be built into the shareholders’ agreement or something that the bank just sends out on its own each year.
  4. Remind shareholders of estate planning issues: Either in conjunction with the annual certification or separately, remind shareholders about the consequences upon the shareholder’s death. For example, a shareholder should talk with the attorney who drafted his or her will to confirm that the shares pass to an eligible shareholder.
  5. Train the bank’s corporate secretary: The corporate secretary should be mindful of S corporation qualifications and eligibility issues as well as common issues that could impact the S election. The corporate secretary can possibly help avoid an inadvertent termination by being proactive and asking the right questions.
  6. Road map memos: Banks should consider requiring shareholders, for example, as part of the shareholders’ agreement, to have their estate planning attorneys provide the bankers with a letter or memorandum detailing what happens to the shares upon the death of a shareholder, especially if the shares are already held in a trust.

By taking the steps above, a potential inadvertent termination of a bank’s subchapter S election can be avoided. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

A New Delaware M&A Case Is a Warning to Investment Bankers: Take Care That You Don’t Mislead the Board

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investment-bankers-12-21-15.pngMerger and acquisition activity appears to be accelerating among community banks large and small. Despite the nearly ubiquitous shareholder lawsuit that follows a merger announcement from a publicly traded target company, the corporate law relating to the obligations of a board of directors in a merger transaction is well developed and favorable. There is a high bar for board culpability in an M&A transaction, and an even higher bar for board liability. However, recent Delaware court cases have highlighted potential liability for investment bankers that is not shared by directors. This is quite an alarming development, which is of obvious concern to investment bankers, but also should impact boards of directors as they consider deals.

Under Delaware law, which is followed by most states, the primary obligations of the board in a merger transaction relate to good faith, a component of the duty of loyalty, and making an informed decision, duty of care. Fortunately, most companies have a charter provision eliminating director personal liability for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care, which is not allowed for breaches of the duty of loyalty. And, according to the Delaware Supreme Court in the Lyondell case, director personal liability for “bad faith” requires a knowing violation of fiduciary duties. For example, in a sale transaction, shareholders aren’t supposed to act on a goal other than maximizing value, or in a non-sale merger, act for reasons unrelated to the best interests of the stockholders generally.

Another important hallmark of Delaware M&A case law is the extreme reluctance of judges to enjoin a stockholder vote on a merger transaction when there is no competing offer. And once a transaction closes, and the challenged target company directors were independent and disinterested, and did not act with the intent to violate their duties, judges typically dismiss the lawsuits against directors.

However, in a recent case, which involved the sale of a company called Rural/Metro Corporation, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that third parties, such as investment bankers, can be liable for damages if their actions caused a board to breach its duty of care, even if directors are not liable for the breach. Moreover, simple negligence by the board, rather than gross negligence, can serve as the basis for third party liability.

In Rural/Metro, the investment bankers were found to have had numerous conflicts of interest, most of which were not discussed with the board. They sought to participate in the buyer’s financing of the acquisition and they sought to leverage their involvement with the seller, Rural/Metro, to obtain a financing role in another merger transaction. They were also found to have manipulated the fairness analysis to serve their conflicted interest in having a particular party win the bid for Rural/Metro. The court held the behavior of the investment bankers caused the board to be uninformed as to the value of the company and caused misleading disclosure. They were held liable to stockholders for $76 million in damages.

The Delaware Supreme Court stated that a board needs to be active and reasonably informed in its oversight of a sale process and must identify and respond to actual or potential conflicts of interest as to its advisers. Importantly, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s characterization of the role and obligations of an investment banker as a quasi fiduciary “gate keeper,” and stated that the obligations of an investment banker are primarily contractual in nature. It further held that liability of an investment banker will not be based on its failure to take steps to prevent a director breach but on its intentional actions causing a breach.

The case is a warning for both boards and investment bankers: Take care when there is a conflict of interest. Investment bankers should avoid conflicts where possible, disclose all conflicts to the board and the board and the investment bankers need to work diligently to address conflicts adequately. In order to do their job well, board members must make sure their advisors are telling them what they need to know.

Assessing Your Say-on-Pay Vote

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As banks prepare for their annual shareholder meetings, most will have a say-on-pay vote where shareholders indicate whether they support the executive compensation program. This process has pressured companies to improve their compensation disclosures and clearly explain their pay practices and decisions. Today’s bank boards should engage with shareholders to understand their evolving perspectives on compensation and governance practices.

Meridian Compensation Partners’ Susan O’Donnell and Daniel Rodda discuss how to interpret your say-on-pay results and how to prepare for next year’s vote.

What do directors need to understand about the results of their 2015 say-on-pay vote?
Directors should know what percentage of their shareholders voted in favor of their executive compensation programs, and how that level of support compared to prior years. Receiving majority support isn’t enough. Over 70 percent of banks last proxy season received a favorable shareholder vote on their programs of 90 percent or more, so any result below that level suggests potential concerns. If your bank receives less than 70 percent support, shareholders and advisory firms such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) will expect to hear specific details on how the company responded to feedback, and they will conduct a more rigorous assessment the following year. Strong shareholder support one year does not guarantee future success. We have seen the result change swiftly when not monitored.

How can directors understand what drove the results of their say-on-pay vote?
Directors should understand the makeup of their shareholder base, as there are differences in what drives the voting patterns of retail and institutional investors. Many institutional shareholders are influenced by ISS and another prominent shareholder advisory firm, Glass Lewis, so it is valuable to review their vote reports. Other institutional shareholders, like Blackrock and Vanguard, follow their own voting guidelines. While pay outcomes are more easily controlled, say-on-pay also reflects how shareholders view performance, primarily based on total shareholder return (both relative to peers and on an absolute basis). Directors need to take an objective look at how shareholders will view the relationship between executive pay and the bank’s performance.

How can banks improve the results of their say-on-pay vote?
Ensuring a significant portion of your total pay program is variable and that actual pay outcomes vary based on performance are the best ways to gain shareholder support. It is also important to maintain and disclose policies and practices that reinforce sound governance, such as stock ownership requirements, clawback policies, minimal perquisites and elimination of any tax gross-ups. The Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) section of your company’s annual proxy must effectively communicate the context and rationale for pay decisions, as well as how the programs ensure alignment between pay and performance. Investors want to understand the “how and why” of compensation decisions, including why performance measures were chosen, how pay decisions were made, and how the compensation program is aligned with shareholder value. If the say-on-pay vote receives less than 90 percent support, banks should consider reaching out to large shareholders to understand any concerns they may have. Additionally, banks that received negative recommendations from ISS and Glass Lewis should reach out to these advisory firms to discuss what led to their recommendation and what might address their concerns.

When should banks begin preparing for the following year’s say-on-pay vote?
Directors should already be thinking ahead to next year’s vote. The board has likely already made pay decisions in 2015 that will be evaluated as part of the 2016 say-on-pay vote. Typically, salary increases and equity awards are made in the first quarter of the year, but shareholders will be evaluating those decisions through the lens of performance through the end of the year. This can at times lead to an unfortunate disconnect. As a result, it is never too early to consider decisions in light of shareholder perspectives and the potential impact on the say-on-pay vote. In addition, ongoing shareholder outreach is viewed positively by investors and can proactively surface potential issues while there is still time to make changes. Being proactive and considering pay in the broader context of bank performance and shareholder perspectives should be an ongoing process.

Don’t Sell the Bank

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2-18-15-Al.pngI recently read a report from FIG Partners, an investment bank, that says “M&A pricing is actually much stronger than investors realize given the fact the capital levels are twice—or at least significantly higher—than the past cycle and now price-to-tangible book values are rising.” So if pricing is, in general, improving from a seller’s perspective, it is easy to see why a bank’s board of directors would consider putting the bank up for sale.

But my question is: Why sell now when better times might be ahead?

True, addressing this issue largely depends on how the institution is positioned, geographically, by product line and yes, asset size. Further, I realize a bird in hand is worth two in the bush, and this wait-and-see approach is one that a number of advisers warn boards from taking. However, while the pool of potential buyers is larger than previous years, I don’t see it as aggressive as some would lead you to think.

Still, figuring out when a bank should be a buyer—or a seller—has been on my mind since the Royal Bank of Canada announced a deal for “Hollywood’s bank,” City National Corp., for $5.4 billion. This is the most expensive large U.S. bank deal announced since the financial crisis, based on a price-to-tangible book value of 262 percent. Since that announcement, various media outlets have speculated that buyers will pay a premium for trophy properties like City National. Many anticipate banks that cater to the wealthy will be front and center. But I’m not so sure that institutions with a similar clientele, like San Francisco-based First Republic Bank, should sell, even if approached with a huge multiple.

If you’re not familiar with First Republic, I find the bank’s story fascinating. Jim Herbert founded the bank in 1985, sold it to Merrill in 2007 for 360 percent of book value, took it private through a management-led buyout in July 2010 after Merrill was acquired by Bank of America, then took it public again in December through an initial public offering. A few years ago I sat down with Jim in their New York City offices and came away impressed: not only is the bank solely focused on organic growth, it’s also focused solely on private banking.

So I wonder. Members of First Republic’s board have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders; however, does a short-term premium trump sustained long-term potential?  For a bank that caters to the wealthy, business executives and owners, I’m sure the U.S. Department of Labor’s announcement that the U.S. economy created 257,000 jobs in January—making this the longest stretch of sustained monthly growth since the early 1990s—was well received. While the unemployment rate ticked back up to 5.7 percent, from 5.6 percent in December, The Wall Street Journal reports that the climb was likely because more Americans said they were looking for jobs, a sign of growing confidence.  As the tide begins to rise, why sell the proverbial boat?

Moreover, a recent report from Deloitte’s Center for Financial Services says that, “the encouraging M&A activity seen in 2014 is likely to continue through 2015, driven by a number of factors: stronger balance sheets, the pursuit of stable deposit franchises, improving loan origination, revenue growth challenges, and limits to cost efficiencies.” However, their 2015 Banking Outlook also acknowledged that “as banks move from a defensive to an offensive position to seek growth and scale, they should view M&A targets with a sharper focus on factors such as efficiencies, growth prospects, funding profile, technology, and compliance.”

So rather than consider an exit, isn’t now the time to double down on your growth efforts?

Performance-Driven Retirement Plans: Are They Right for Your Bank?

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1-5-15-Equias.pngBank boards do not like to lose executive talent to competing banking organizations. Developing a compensation plan that is aligned with shareholder interests and retains key executives continues to be an important objective for compensation committees. Compensation committees need to evaluate a variety of compensation strategies to determine which will be the most effective at retaining and recruiting key high performing lenders and executives. While offering competitive salary and performance-based annual bonus amounts are a given, providing additional long-term incentives and/or retirement benefits can be the missing component. Equity plans provide an element of longer-term compensation, but are not available in many privately-held banks and, even where offered, can be complemented by other types of long-term incentive plans.

According to the American Bankers Association 2013 Compensation and Benefits Survey, 64 percent of respondents offered some kind of nonqualified deferred compensation plan for top management (CEO, C-level, executive vice president). (See our article, “Is Your Compensation Plan Generous Enough?”) Choosing the right retirement plan must incorporate the compensation committee’s overall compensation philosophy and bank objectives.

This article will focus on performance-driven retirement plans, a type of defined contribution nonqualified plan. Long-term incentive plans that are performance driven are generally well-received by shareholders. When such plans are properly designed, if the bank’s shareholders do well, so will the executives.

As an example, let’s assume the bank desires to implement a performance-driven retirement plan for a key lender who is 35 years old. Let’s also assume that if the lender meets both department and individual target goals along with the bank-wide net income goal, the lender will receive an annual grant of 10 percent of salary. The bank will cap the grant at 20 percent of salary if maximum performance goals are attained. For this individual, assume the annual contribution is based on a combination of loan growth, deposit growth and bank-wide net income. The goals and the weighting of each goal will vary by officer.

Assuming normal retirement age of 65, and 10 percent of salary contributions each year, the executive is projected to be credited with almost $400,000 in bank contributions. With interest added to the account, the retirement benefit is expected to be almost $80,000 per year for 15 years, a total benefit of $1.2 million. The payments are contingent on the executive not taking a job where he or she competes with the bank after retirement.

This type of arrangement is documented in a legal agreement between the bank and the executive. The agreement must comply with IRC Section 409A and should address various agreement terms and conditions including:

  • Early voluntary termination
  • Disability
  • Change in control
  • Pre-retirement death 
  • Death during payout
  • Non-compete and non-solicitation of customers and employees
  • Holdbacks
  • Qualifiers such as satisfactory performance evaluations and credit quality
  • Form (number of years) and timing (age or date) of benefit distributions

It is critical that bank-wide goals along with department and individual goals be linked to the bank’s budget and overall strategic plan. The goal setting process is typically the most challenging step in designing the plan. Some banks use moving averages (such as the bank’s three-year average net income) and other longer-term measures to determine executive performance and bank contributions.

Rewarding executives with a meaningful compensation package tied to long-term shareholder return is a balancing act. While there is not a one-size-fits-all approach for designing and implementing this type of plan, the facts and circumstances of each bank will dictate the best design after taking into account the bank’s culture and compensation philosophy.

Equias Alliance offers securities through ProEquities, Inc. member FINRA & SIPC. Equias Alliance is independent of ProEquities, Inc.

Why Book Value Isn’t the Only Way to Measure a Bank

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11-14-14-Al.jpgA few days ago, I woke up to the announcement that Winston-Salem, North Carolina-based BB&T Corp. has a deal in place to acquire Lititz, Pennsylvania-based Susquehanna Bancshares in a $2.5 billion deal. The purchase price is 70 percent stock and 30 percent cash and includes 0.253 BB&T shares and $4.05 in cash for each Susquehanna share. The implied price of $13.50 per share equates to 169 percent tangible book value, 16.3 times price as a multiple of last-twelve-months earnings per share and a 7.4 percent deposit premium.

While easy to see the deal as being strategically compelling from BB&T’s perspective (the deal makers expect to generate cost savings from the combined institution, targeting $160 million annually or 32 percent of Susquehanna’s non-interest expense), the announcement had me unexpectedly thinking about valuation issues and Warren Buffet.

Yes, Warren Buffet.

Let me explain the correlation between the two. A year ago, Buffet was on CNBC and took a question from a viewer about how he valued banks. In his words, “a bank that earns 1.3 percent or 1.4 percent on assets is going to end up selling above tangible book value. If it’s earning 0.6 percent or 0.5 percent on assets it’s not going to sell. Book value is not key to valuing banks. Earnings are key to valuing banks.“

Keep in mind that for many smaller community banks, book value has been the primary determinant of value on a trading basis. As the lion’s share of mergers and acquisitions have involved small community banks over the past few years, talk of book value has been quite prevalent. So the BB&T deal, the second largest so far this year, got me thinking about valuation issues and if an increased focus on price to earnings might be a more appropriate way to value banks.

To get some perspective on this topic, I reached out to Dory Wiley, president and CEO of Commerce Street Holdings. He sees earnings as more important, but was quick to remind me that tangible book value does matter.

John Gorman, a partner in the Washington, D.C.-based law firm of Luse Gorman Pomerenk & Schick, P.C. provided additional context. “Having value driven by earnings is the goal for most publicly traded community banks, and that goal is bearing fruit, but in a discriminating fashion. The market is being selective in terms of which companies it is rewarding with earnings-based valuation on a trading basis. And that reward provides those select companies with a competitive advantage in terms of paying the higher price-to-earnings and price-to-book multiples in the M&A marketplace.”

Andy Gibbs of Mercer Capital opined “it is earnings, after all, that are the source of the capital needed to reinvest in the bank (and grow its value), to pay dividends to shareholders, or to repurchase shares. A well capitalized bank can do those things in the short-run, but without earnings to replenish and expand capital, it’s not sustainable.”

Clearly, a bank that generates greater returns to shareholders is more valuable; thus, the emphasis on earnings and returns rather than book value. To this end, Gorman says: “If a company is a strong earner, and is located in an attractive geographic market, it may be able to obtain a significant M&A premium and thereby realize an earnings-based valuation.”

So investors and buyers will always use book value as a way to measure the worth of banks. But as the market improves and more acquisitions are announced, expect to see more attention to earnings and price to earnings as a way to value banks.