The Three M&A Virtues of M&T

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merger-1-4-19.pngM&T Bank Corp.—the $117 billion asset bank holding company headquartered in Buffalo, New York—is well-known for its disciplined approach to M&A, a strategy that has served the big regional bank well through the 18 whole-bank acquisitions it has made since 1987.

Its most recent deal, which closed in November 2015, was also its biggest—the purchase of Hudson City Bancorp, a Paramus, New Jersey-based regional thrift that expanded M&T’s reach in New Jersey, Connecticut and parts of New York City, adding $37 billion in assets and $18 billion in deposits.

The well-priced deal led to M&T’s first-place tie with Phoenix, Arizona-based Western Alliance Bancorp. for the Best M&A Strategy in Bank Director’s 2019 RankingBanking study.

Given M&T’s three decades of successful deals, Bank Director interviewed M&T Chief Financial Officer Darren King to explore the bank’s philosophy around M&A. He says three values drive its M&A strategy.

The first—and perhaps most important value—is patience. Put simply, if a deal doesn’t align with M&T’s strategy, it won’t happen.

“We’ve never been a bank that’s been interested in growth just for growth’s sake,” says King. M&T is laser-focused on getting a return on the dollars invested, whether that’s for an acquisition, an investment in technology or any other investment made to grow and improve the business.

“Our job is to provide our shareholders with a better-than-average return on their investment,” says King. That focus on returns—rather than chasing growth—yields the discipline the bank needs to execute on its strategy.

Part of that patience means the bank will wait for the right partner—one that is committed to the long-term success of the deal. This is the second value that drives dealmaking at M&T.

“One of the places that helps you earn that return [on investment] is the price that you pay,” says King. Committed partners tend to hold to a more long-term view on that point. “Our hope is that anyone who is a willing partner—which is precondition for us for the combination—would like to be paid in our stock, and therefore the price [paid] isn’t necessarily a reflection of the value that would be created for both [entities’] shareholders by putting the two organizations together.” A lower price in a successful transaction will have a positive impact on M&T’s stock—which benefits the seller as a stockholder.

Having so-called skin in the game by taking stock in the transaction also represents a commitment from the seller that the acquired bank’s management team will stay on board to ensure the future success of the merged entity—and raise the value of the stock.

“They don’t want someone to sell their bank to M&T, and go away and retire,” says Brian Klock, a managing director at Keefe, Bruyette and Woods, who covers M&T. “They want to have those local managers and executives that will make a difference and be the M&T leader in that market, so they want those executives to stay around. If they take M&T stock and don’t take as big a price, that’s a commitment from the bank that’s selling to them.”

The final value for M&T is its consideration for the size and location of the target.

“We’re cautious not to go too big, because then it increases the risk,” says King. Integrating a large deal can get out of hand if a bank bites off more than it can chew. But a deal can’t be too small either, he says, because some of the risks related to integration and conversion aren’t scalable. “If you’re going to take on that risk, it needs to be worth the trip,” King says.

M&T also prefers in-market deals or locations in contiguous markets, where its brand is well known.

Outsiders may see M&T as a bank focused on price, but that’s not the case, says King. “If you look at our history, people would describe us as focused on price, and we buy troubled assets,” he says.

Economic downturns tend to yield troubled franchises with strong long-term potential. Having the discipline to focus on long-term returns—not just price—puts M&T in a position to take advantage of opportunities in the marketplace. M&T scooped up four banks—totaling more than $10 billion in assets—from late 2007 through August 2009. It gained another $10.8 billion through its acquisition of Wilmington Trust in May 2011.

It’s often said the best deal is the one you don’t make. By making deals that adhere to three key M&A virtues—patience, focusing on in-market targets that are the right size, and finding a committed partner—M&T’s disciplined approach has served it well.

Why Purchase Accounting Matters So Much During a Bank Deal

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accounting-12-24-18.pngBank management must understand how purchase accounting works, how it can impact a transaction, and being involved can ensure all assumptions are complete and accurate. Here’s a specific look at interest rate mark and Core Deposit Intangible (“CDI”) purchase accounting analyses.

These analyses establish fair value of balance sheet assets and liabilities through a series of mark-to-market valuations. In addition to cost savings and transaction expenses, purchase accounting is one of the transaction adjustments that can have the largest impact on the metrics of a deal. Purchase accounting, however, is often seen as less straight-forward than other transaction adjustment components.

Overview of Mark-to-Market Impact of Assets and Liabilities
To evaluate and engage in discussions with a financial advisor, management must first understand the mechanics of interest rate mark adjustments. A premium on an asset marked-to-market will increase the value of the asset and in capital on day 1, which is then amortized through interest income over the remaining life of the asset. Conversely, a discount on an asset marked-to market will decrease the value of the asset and in capital on day 1, which is then accreted into interest income over the life of the asset. 

As an offsetting entry in purchase price allocation, the higher fair value of an asset the lower the amount of goodwill created. A premium on an asset will increase tangible book value per share (TBVS) but decrease forward earnings as the mark is amortized, while a discount on an asset will decrease TBVS on day 1 but increase forward earnings as the mark is accreted. Liabilities are intuitively the opposite of assets, with a premium resulting in a negative hit to capital on day 1, but lower forward interest expense over the life of the products. A discount will bolster capital on day 1 but will increase forward interest expense over time.

One item of note in the mark-to-market of loans is exit pricing. To represent additional risk assumed with a loan acquisition, an exit premium should be applied to each loan type and should capture a liquidity discount as well as an underwriting discount. Exit prices should vary by loan type. The liquidity and underwriting risk on a 1-4 family residential loan is very different than a speculative construction loan, and the different characteristics should be captured in market values and exit prices.

Publicly reporting institutions now have to to begin reporting the fair value of its loan portfolio under the “exit” price application, which illustrates the importance and proliferation of exit price methodology across the industry, not just in M&A transactions.

Land and buildings are assessed by comparing the net book value (with accumulated depreciation) against a third-party valuation. The mark on buildings will be accreted/amortized over the remaining life of the property.

The CDI takes into account the qualitative value of deposit relationships. There are multiple variables that can impact a CDI but the following provides an overview of major components: weighted average life of a product, cost of core deposit related activities, fee income on core deposits and alternative cost of funding and discount rates. The higher the values for any of these components, the higher the CDI. These variables may be offset by noninterest expense associated with core deposit related activities and the discount rate, for which higher values will reduce the CDI.

Management Involvement
Given the intricacies with mark-to-market purchase accounting, it is clear management should engage a financial advisor to explain the assumptions driving each adjustment and the impact. 

Mark-to-market purchase accounting is not something that should be approached only as a requirement of closing. The financial advisor in a transaction should also be conducting purchase accounting as part of due diligence.

If detailed purchase accounting is not occurring, there could be material marks not accounted for that can drastically affect the metrics of a transaction. Your financial advisors should on a regular basis explain the fair value assessment process and the methodologies.

Key Takeaways
Transaction adjustments are rarely detailed in pro forma analytics, which limits management’s ability to engage in meaningful conversation with its financial advisor. The best financial advisors provide a detailed breakout of all transaction adjustments to provide management with as much knowledge as possible. Without that, it is impossible for management to have the understanding required to ask important questions and actively participate in review of assumptions.

Always request full detail on all adjustments and to have management walked through each adjustment, along with the assumptions and methodologies used. Have calls throughout the process, and remember that fair value analyses are not reserved for closing. This should start early in due diligence. Interest rate marks and CDI can have a meaningful effect on the metrics of a transaction and, if not modeled properly, can create a misleading picture. It is crucial to first verify that the firm has the capacity to model with management and have a meaningful dialogue on critical assumptions.

These assumptions will make or break a deal and will continue drive the resultant entity’s accounting long after the transaction closes.

Your M&A Success Could Depend On This One Thing

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merger-12-19-18.pngBenchmarking key performance indicators (KPIs) can help you more fully understand your bank’s financial condition and operating results, as well as the true value in a potential M&A market.

The success of your M&A strategy – whether buy, sell or stay – measurably increases with a sound grasp of the metrics that drive shareholder value.

KPIs as M&A drivers
KPIs can help you to identify important strengths in your target organization and your own institution. This can help determine the areas you could strengthen in an acquisition, or understand where your bank’s value lies within a merger. You can also learn about your organization’s, or your target institution’s, primary challenges and how this might impact the transaction.

These metrics can also help the organization evaluate the success of the transaction after completion. Have the key performance indicators drastically changed? Was that change different from the anticipated adjustment from the combination of the two entities? Understanding the metrics, and some of the forces impacting them, can be a strong foundation for successful M&A transactions.

Q3 2018 KPI observations
Community banks throughout the U.S. used the strong economy and relatively stable interest rate environment to maintain steady operations throughout the third quarter of 2018.

Baker Tilly’s banking industry key performance indicator (KPI) report reflected almost no change in comparison to the same benchmarks for the second quarter of 2018. Earnings, credit quality and capital adequacy benchmarks all remained essentially the same. This consistency appears to reflect a more stable economic environment, disciplined management of credit pricing and quality, notwithstanding a continued highly competitive environment, and the early stages of a move to higher interest rates.

M-A-chart.png

If there is anything to take away from the relatively unchanged KPIs over the first nine months of 2018, it is that community bankers have diligently pursued the opportunities emerging from the strong economy.

Loan growth, reflected in the comparison of the loan-to-deposits ratios each quarter, has been somewhat subdued. Potential drivers of this include increasing liquidity pressures arising from changes in interest rates, early stages of the potential for a downward credit cycle and the uncertainty of the November midterm elections. These factors kept many community bankers focused on internal matters such as compliance and technology during the second and third quarters of 2018.

Many banks continued to assess consolidation opportunities on both the buy and sell side. Until the recent series of market declines, bank equity currency remained quite strong, supporting a continued active consolidation of the industry, at price points that, on average, exceed 1.5 – 1.7 times book value.

We expect more of the same consistency in the KPIs as we have seen throughout 2018. It does not appear there will be any significant shifts in either direction arising from changes in economic policy. However, the pace of deregulation may subside due to the change in leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives.

If equity markets rebound following the midterms and the Federal Reserve pauses its increase of interest rates, we may see a re-acceleration of the consolidation of community banks, especially those with assets of $500 million or less. Other than an increased emphasis on securing and maintaining low cost deposits, we anticipate community banks to maintain a steady course into early 2019.

Solving the Deposit Dilemma with an Unconventional M&A Strategy

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merger-11-19-18.pngWe are in unprecedented times. The Fed is reversing both its zero-interest rate policy and quantitative easing (QE). Many banks have excessive loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratios, which are crimping growth and profitability. Rates on interest-bearing deposits are beginning to move upward, while deposits are starting to leave.

As banks grapple with their deposit issues, they must consider several hard truths, all of which suggest an unconventional strategy might be the best option.

M&A as a Solution?
While there is no panacea for the deposit challenge, affected banks must explore acquisitions. M&A is the one strategy that can significantly alter the balance sheet and the LTD ratio virtually overnight. M&A is an especially effective strategy in an environment in which organic growth is tough, if not impossible. However, while this strategy seems good in theory, there are three practical problems:

  1. Most banks with an LTD problem are in growth markets, yet growth markets have few banks with low LTD ratios.
  2. Those handful of banks with low LTD ratios are not for sale.
  3. Conventional valuation methods (EPS accretion, TBV dilution, etc.) won’t work, either because the acquiring bank doesn’t have strong enough currency, or the seller (if it exists) wants a valuation that appears excessive relative to recent comparable transactions.

An Unconventional Approach to M&A
Unprecedented times call for unconventional strategies. And that means community banks should consider out-of-market acquisitions, with a particular focus on lower-growth and rural markets.

This strategy can increase the number of viable targets and create significant financial value for the acquirer because of the potential deposit growth. There is also strategic value since a bank can increase its deposit portfolio, add loans in a new market, helping diversify the loan portfolio from a credit risk perspective. The bank can then deploy excess deposits into its legacy market where deposits are a scarce commodity, essentially optimizing its role as a financial intermediary.

While the acquiring bank might be concerned about its unfamiliarity with the target’s market, this is more than offset by, a more conservative lending culture, the lower “beta” of its market relative to the overall economy, and the opportunity to retain the target’s key leadership and employees, who understand the market and customers.

However, the need to retain more personnel and the absence of branch overlap also means less opportunity for cost reductions. In addition, many of these banks will demand valuations that might appear excessive if enticed to sell.

Banks lucky enough to have a fungible equity currency trading at an attractive multiple can solve this problem, but banks with out-of-balance LTD ratios are less likely to be in that situation. They must use more cash or a weaker equity currency to fund the transaction.

Conventional techniques such as EPS accretion and TBV dilution analysis cannot properly measure the impact of these transactions on shareholder value. One problem is banks often make rosy, unrealistic assumptions about loan growth, deposit growth, loan yields, and cost of funds. This sets the bar way too high, leading to lower EPS accretion, greater TBV dilution and a slower payback period.

Different analytics are required to properly value the balance sheet components of a prospective acquisition. The valuation of a target’s deposits must capture the ability to replicate such deposits with organic growth (which is just about impossible in this environment), the increase in capacity and impact on profitability to preserve or make loans with those deposits, and the downside protection the target’s deposits provide against a deposit drain caused by QE reversal.

Management teams must begin educating directors and shareholders on these challenges. Management will need to prepare their argument carefully because this strategy is counterintuitive. If the case is laid out properly, the vast majority of directors and shareholders will recognize how these types of acquisitions can ultimately maximize shareholder value.

Remember: This unconventional M&A strategy requires a first-mover advantage. A handful of banks in growth markets are already pursuing this kind of plan. In six to 12 months, expect more banks to follow suit, creating a mad rush to the proverbial rural door. By then it will be too late, as those low LTD ratio banks willing to sell will have already been picked off. Waiting until the “big fish” in your market announces an out-of-market acquisition to make it easier for you to pursue such a strategy is a mistake. This is where the CEO’s courage and leadership come in.

Many banks, especially banks in growth markets, are finding themselves at a crossroads. The urgency to grow deposits is increasing, yet the pie for deposits in the market is either not growing or shrinking. While out-of-market acquisitions might still be a long shot, they must be explored as a potential solution.

Three Lessons for Bankers From Warren Buffett

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strategy-11-16-18.pngIt’s reasonable to argue that the greatest banker in the United States today isn’t a banker at all—he’s an insurance guy.

You might have heard of him.

Warren Buffett.

As the chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, an insurance-focused conglomerate based in Omaha, Nebraska, Buffett oversees one of the largest portfolios of bank investments in the country.

Berkshire owns major stakes in a Who’s Who list of historically high-performing banks:

  • 9.9 percent of Wells Fargo & Co. 
  • 6.8 percent of Bank of America Corp.
  • 6.3 percent of U.S. Bancorp
  • 5.3 percent of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
  • 3.7 percent of M&T Bank Corp.

That Buffett made such substantial investments in banks isn’t a coincidence.

If there are two things he appreciates at a visceral level, owing to his experience in insurance, it’s leverage and cycles—the same two qualities that make banking so unique.

This is why it’s worth listening to Buffett when he opines on banking, as he often does in his annual letters and media interviews.

This is from his 1991 shareholder letter:

“When assets are 20 times equity—a common ratio in [the bank] industry—mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the ‘institutional imperative:’ the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so.”

Buffett is referring to the havoc wreaked on banks during a pronounced downturn in commercial real estate in the early 1990s, when Berkshire bought 10 percent of Wells Fargo.

His point is that it’s critical for bankers to maintain discipline, especially when all of those around you are not.

Another thing Buffett talks about a lot is competitive advantage.

Here he is in a 2009 interview with Fortune:

“If you’re the low-cost producer in any business—and money is your raw material in banking—you’ve got a hell of an edge. If you have a half-point edge . . . half a point on $1 trillion is $5 billion a year.”

And here‘s a selection from his 1987 shareholder letter flushing out the idea more fully, though in the context of the insurance industry, which faces nearly identical competitive dynamics to banking:

“The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook: hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commodity-like business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high profitability levels.”

One nuance about efficiency in banking is it doesn’t just boost profitability directly by freeing up more revenue to fall to the bottom line; equally important is its indirect effect.

This is a point U.S. Bancorp’s chairman and CEO Andy Cecere made in a recent, albeit unrelated, interview about the bank with Bank Director.

Efficient banks needn’t stretch on credit quality to generate satisfactory returns, which reduces loan losses at the bottom of the credit cycle, Cecere says. And as a corollary, efficient banks can compete more aggressively for the most creditworthy customers, further limiting credit losses in tough times.

It isn’t a coincidence, in turn, that U.S. Bancorp has consistently been one of the industry’s most efficient banks and disciplined underwriters since its transformative merger nearly two decades ago.

And while neither Buffett nor his philosophy came up during the interview with Cecere, Berkshire Hathaway is one of U.S. Bancorp’s biggest shareholders.

A final lesson about banking that can be gleaned from Buffett involves his approach to mergers and acquisitions.

Buffett has said repeatedly in the past that he’d rather pay a fair price for a wonderful company than a wonderful price for a fair company. Also, all things being equal, Buffett has always preferred for existing management to stay and continue on their path of success.

“Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a ‘cheap’ price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.”

It’s a style reminiscent of the uncommon partnership approach to mergers and acquisitions used by John B. McCoy, who dined annually with Buffett, to transform the former Bank One from the third largest bank in Columbus, Ohio, into the sixth largest bank in the country, before later merging into JPMorgan Chase & Co.

In short, although it’s true that most people don’t think of Buffett as a banker, that doesn’t mean bankers can’t learn a lot from his observations on the industry.

One Risk in M&A You Maybe Have Not Considered

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core-provider-9-25-18.pngThe vast majority of middle-market community banks and credit unions will at some point explore acquiring or being acquired because M&As are one of the quickest and most effective ways a bank can scale up, expand reach, and grow. Unfortunately, many of these banks have no choice but to watch lucrative opportunities pass them by because they unwittingly agreed to grossly unfair and inequitable terms in their core and IT contracts.

Financial institutions constantly assess risk from nearly every conceivable perspective to protect shareholder value, but far too many realize too late that hidden astronomical M&A termination fees and other hidden contractual penalties render a deal totally unfeasible. Over and over again, blindsided banks are hobbled by stifled growth.

Simply stated, core and IT suppliers punish banks with excessive termination, de-conversion and conversion fees because they can get away with it. Suppliers also sneak in large clawbacks for discounts awarded in the past as an added pain for measure. Banks fall for it because they don’t know better.

Bank deals are complex procedures with the possibility of extraordinary payoff or extraordinary peril. Terms regarding potential M&As are buried deep within the pages of lengthy and convoluted core and IT supplier contracts. Suppliers are betting that arduous language within these five- to seven-year agreements deter bankers from looking too closely or fully comprehending terms and conditions they contain. Many banks are not thinking about a merger or acquisition when they originally signed those contracts. The suppliers’ bets pay off, and banks either lose the deal or are forced to pay in spades.

Termination fees core and IT suppliers secure for themselves in most contracts with community banks and credit unions border on unconscionable. Banks find themselves saddled with the prospect of paying 50, 80, or even 100 percent of the amount due to the core provider based on what would have been paid if the institution remained with that supplier for the life of the contract.

And these fees apply even if the financial institution they’re merging with or acquiring has the same core IT supplier. Even in cases where the core has virtually nothing to lose in the deal, they still demand a fat check for their “pains.” These fees are so high they can easily kill a potential deal before it even reaches the negotiating table — and they often do.

Banks Have Defendable Rights
A contract isn’t a contract unless there’s some cost for exiting it early. But there’s fair and then there’s fleecing — and let’s just say core and IT suppliers wield a pretty big pair of shears.

The reality is that more than half of all states will not tolerate these termination fees in court, provided they’re challenged by institutions. The maximum amount of liquidated damages a supplier is entitled to legally — provided they can rationalize how they were harmed — is the discounted value of remaining net profit. This might not be more than 18 to 22 percent of remaining contract value, or about one year on a five-year deal. That’s nowhere close to what is often claimed by core suppliers.

But you have to know your rights before you can demand they be respected, and a wealth of knowledge regarding the most favorable core and IT contract terms available can’t be acquired overnight. It’s taken many years for Paladin to amass proprietary core and IT supplier contract data.

Secure Fair Terms Now to Protect Deals Later
By updating your contracts before a transaction, you can speed the M&A process, protect your institution and shareholders, and prevent unforeseen deal risks. But you’ll need to come armed and ready for battle. Core and IT suppliers have enjoyed decades of manipulating the system to their advantage. Going it alone in your next contract negotiation will likely result in ending up with more of the same hidden and unfair terms. That’s how good these guys are at getting what they want from the community banks they call their “partners.”

There are experts with a proven track record of going toe-to-toe with core and IT suppliers and coming out ahead for community financial institutions. Time and again, we’ve approached the table with our clients, advocated for a fair deal, and walked away with terms that make sense for both parties — not just the suppliers.

The Avoidable Mistakes that Acquirers Make

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acquisition-9-17-18.pngFor many bank boards of directors and senior management teams, an acquisition will be the most important deal they ever make. Unfortunately, even experienced acquirers make mistakes that can have a negative—and sometimes even disastrous—impact on the outcome. And they are all avoidable.

Be Able To Say Why
One of the most common missteps is to pull the trigger on a deal without having a clear rationale for why a particular acquisition target—as opposed to other possible candidates—is the best strategic fit. “Some acquirers tend to be more opportunistic and try to assess on the fly whether or not the deal is a good fit, as opposed to knowing before hand that they really want to acquire institutions that have certain parameters,” says Rick Childs, a partner at the consulting firm Crowe LLP. “It may be that they make a certain level of money, or do a certain type of lending, or operate in a desirable geography.”

In almost every instance, doing no deal is better than doing the wrong deal. Says Childs: “My dad used to tell me a long time ago, when I would say that something was on sale, ‘Son, a bargain isn’t a bargain if you don’t need it,’ which is to say if it doesn’t really fit, you’re better to walk away from that and focus on… opportunities that would really advance your cause as an organization and produce the returns you need for your shareholders.”

Cultural Compatibility
Having a well-developed a well-defined set of criteria in advance enables the acquirer to then assess critical elements such as the target’s culture—which is important because misaligned cultures can lead to significant problems after the deal has closed and the banks need to be integrated. “I find that many times buyers don’t take the time to learn whether the organizations are compatible,” says Gary Bronstein, a partner at the law firm Kilpatrick Townsend. “And this is especially important when the seller will become a significant part of the merged organization. Too often, says Bronstein, buyers fail to focus on this issue until the integration process begins. “And it becomes [apparent] that perhaps the cultures of the two organizations in terms of how hard they work, how customers are treated, what the philosophies are in terms of how they operate, might not be compatible and it makes it very difficult to integrate under those circumstances.”

Clear, Consistent Communication
Bronstein also finds that acquirers sometimes fail to place a high enough emphasis on the importance on effective and honest communication with people at the acquired bank. “That is particularly [true] among CEOs of the two organizations,” he says. “I’ve seen many deals fall apart or deteriorate pretty quickly due to bad communication, or lack of thoughtful communication.” Candor is an especially important element of the communication process, Bronstein says. “I’ve seen situations where a buyer CEO will say one thing but then do another thing, and that just alienates people in the process. And it’s critically important to develop a… rapport early, because if things deteriorate early it’s hard to get back,” he cautions.

Consider The People
Many acquirers also tend to wait too long to make critical people decisions that can impact the outcome of a merger. Bronstein divides these important people decisions into three categories. “Category number one is, who do you need long term, and [in] what positions?” he explains. “Who do I need for this larger organization, and what positions can I spot them in? The second category is, who do I need short term to get me through the transition? The common timeline for transition is the technology conversion, which will usually happen somewhere between three and six months after the transaction is closed. And the final thing is, who are the people that are closest to the customers that I really need to lock up with a non-compete so they don’t go next door and compete with me?”

Childs also stresses the importance of communicating these important personnel decisions throughout both organizations. Staffers at either bank who ultimately will not be part of the combined organization once the integration process has been completed should be informed “as quickly and as compassionately as you can,” he says. It’s equally important that employees who will be going forward with the new bank know that their jobs are secure. “Uncertainty breeds angst and anxiety that is going to affect how people treat their day-to-day job, and taking that away and reassuring them is really job number one for the CEO and the management teams.”

The “But” in the Conversation Among Bank Boards, CEOs

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strategy-9-13-18.pngJamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., has now been infamously linked to his declaration that the “golden age of banking” is upon us, though bankers and directors often follow that celebratory tone with a caveat, whether they’re speaking about technology, growth or governance topics.

This dynamic became clear at Bank Director’s 2018 Bank Board Training Forum, held Sept. 10-11 at the Four Seasons Hotel Chicago, where nearly 200 directors, chairmen, lead directors and chief executives discussed how the favorable economy has also added pressure and challenge in a range of areas on the priority lists for bank boards, including governance, technology, risk and, of course, growth.

It is clear that a strong economy has kicked earnings into high gear, which draws headlines when buybacks or 30-percent growth in earnings per share is announced on quarterly earnings calls. But at the same time, transition and new challenges are presenting themselves in front of bank leaders regardless of size, location or whether the company is public or private. The industry is shifting, and so does the conversation when bankers and directors discuss anything from growth strategies to technology.

Banks must embrace and leverage the capability of technological advancements, but…
The cost and risk associated with such integrations are, and will remain, a challenge.

In a closing panel of three successful chief executive officers, Scott Dueser, CEO of First Financial Bankshares in Abilene, Texas, Dorothy Savarese, CEO of The Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank in Southeastern Massachusetts, and Dave Mansfield, CEO of The Provident Bank in Amesbury, Massachusetts, all said cybersecurity and technological improvements are top-of-mind for their companies, but finding a balance between convenience and value are challenging.

“We’re using technology to enhance—take away the menial tasks. We have to deliver value. We’re not going to do that with just technology,” Mansfield says.

Fintech disruption will continue, but…
“This is not a time to be scared,” says Ed Kelley, vice president of sales for TransCard Payments, LLC, who, along with Ahron Oddman, area vice president at nCino, Inc., billed themselves as “the face of fintech” to the audience.

Payments and small-business lending, which Oddman discussed, highlight two areas where the agility of fintechs enables them to attract more business. Kelley noted that while a challenge, “there’s also a good bit of opportunity” to partner with fintechs to be competitive.

“In order to be competitive, you have to spend money. And in order to spend money, you have to be competitive,” Kelley says, noting the paradox.

Competition among community banks is intense, but…
It’s not seen as coming from the major financial institutions despite their ability to attract low-cost deposits.

Most bankers suggest their competition remains other community banks, credit unions and fintechs, not the largest institutions. Joe Bower, CEO of CNB Bank, a $3 billion bank based in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, says those large institutions “are actually really good for us,” because they often have little interest in the tier of commercial customers a bank similar to his would have, and instead are interested in large-scale commercial real estate clients.

Regulations are beginning to relax, but…
The pressure on sound governance is increasing, both in oversight of bank management and internal governance.

Board refreshment is drawing greater scrutiny as the average age of directors is increasing, according to Alan Kaplan, founder and CEO of Kaplan Partners, a sign that refreshment and diversity remain tough topics for many boards.

A show of hands among attendees indicated that while evaluation is consistent, peer evaluation is less common, though proxy advisory firms like ISS and Glass Lewis are ramping up pressure on boards to evaluate their performance with greater frequency.

Regulators are also placing greater scrutiny on board oversight, highlighted by “direct finger pointing” at the board of Wells Fargo & Co. by the Federal Reserve and legal actions against loan committees in the wake of the financial crisis.

M&A is increasing in number and “red hot,” but…
Traditionally hot metropolitan markets are becoming scarcer in terms of potential targets, and some banks are considering alternatives to traditional deals.

Jonathan Hightower, an M&A attorney in Atlanta with Bryan Cave, points to WSFS Financial Corp.’s $1.5-billion deal to acquire Beneficial Bancorp Inc., which will result in the new $13 billion bank pouring investments into technology.

Despite an active market, Hightower says boards should carefully vet any potential deal, because “if it doesn’t offer opportunity for growth, what’s the point.” Hightower also notes that banks should consider alternative growth strategies, like an initial public offering, that can provide a different path to raise large amounts of capital.

The financial crisis is firmly in the rearview mirror, and the industry is the healthiest it has been in almost a generation by many metrics. But that should not stop banks from planning for the next downturn, or how they can maintain a competitive advantage against their peers.

“This is the way we compete, we think about these things futuristically,” said Jennifer Burke, a partner with Crowe LLC.

What’s The Same – And What’s Not – In Assessing Credit Quality

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assessment-7-30-18.pngSince the 1970s, there has been an inevitable march toward a macro, quantitative assessment of credit quality. Technology and big data ensured its emergence to complement the more traditional, transactional counterpart of credit risk management.

Since the adoption of the 2006 allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) guidance, and the ferocity of loan losses during the great recession, we have seen the growing confluence among credit, accounting, regulatory and investor constituencies attempting to answer the same age-old questions: How much loss is embedded in the loan portfolio? How much is this portfolio worth?

While having comparable goals, each level of management has its priorities, biases and specialized methodologies for answering those questions. For directors, there may be a need to connect the dots to determine the objective of these measures.

Today’s ALLL
The current loss methodology was also used in 2006, prior to the massive, mainly real estate, credit losses from the great recession. The 2006 methodology included pool, formula-driven and specific impairment loss estimates. The incurred loss bias of the current methodology–often known as a “run-rate” approach–inflates the most recent credit quality performances. With no significant losses prior to the crisis, the industry was largely pushed into the abyss with low loss reserves–unable to raise reserves for forecasted losses. Given the relatively benign state of credit currently, it could be said that we are back to the future, having to defend ALLL levels, largely with qualitative justifications.

Tomorrow’s CECL
The soon-to-be implemented current expected credit loss (CECL) methodology is the inevitable reaction to the roller coaster nature of today’s ALLL. Some even consider it a fall back to the failed bid, about eight years ago, to impose mark-to-market valuations on the entirety of banks’ loan portfolios. Regardless of the pejorative “crystal ball” moniker often describing CECL–not to mention estimates of significant Day One implementation increases in reserves–its integration of historical losses, current conditions and reasonable forecasts is designed to be the more holistic, life-of-loan estimation of losses.

There is a high presumption in CECL that quantitative measures, such as discounted cash flows or probabilities of default (PDs)/loss given defaults (LGDs), overlaid by recovery lags, will be used to project future losses. In theory, it may be a more reliable estimate than the current guidance; however, its greatest hindrance is the perception that it is yet another de facto variant layer of capital buffer mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, and Basel III.

Exit Price Notion
This accounting-based fair value measure disclosure (ASU 2016-01), often referred to as fair value/exit pricing, is new for 2018 and specifies the method by which public financial institutions calculate the fair value of their loan portfolios for purposes of disclosure. Fair value is the amount that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability at the measure date. The estimate of fair value must be supported through specified protocols of valuation and calculation. Credit-based assessments, coupled with ties to loan review and risk grade migrations, will be key to justifying a reasonable, point-in-time fair value calculation.

Credit Mark in Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)
Speaking of fair value, in M&A, it is truly in the eye of the beholder. How skeptical is the buyer? How much does the buyer want the deal? Determining a credit mark, or rational estimate (or range) of discounts to be applied to a prospective purchased loan portfolio, is very much a credit-based, symbiotic marriage between a traditional, more qualitative loan review and the more quantitative metrics of PDs, LGDs, risk grade migrations, yield marks, recovery lags and probabilistic modeling. Using one approach, without the informing nature of the other, is problematic and increases inaccuracies. What is sacrosanct in credit mark, is that an institution never wants to undershoot the estimates. Accounting plays a greater role when the deal-negotiated credit mark is refreshed at the deal’s completion, known as Day One accounting.

The credit discipline has often described as a qualitative decision stacked on an array of quantitative metrics. That remains an apt description for transactional credit–where it all begins. However, the new frontier in managing credit risk, even at smaller financial institutions, is in the ever-evolving, mostly mandated, macro, quantitative measures–some of which are described above. Each of these, not unlike a Venn diagram, has similarities and overlapping portions, but each has separate purposes, as well. Directors, like credit officers, need to understand and embrace these quantitative measures, which will, in turn, lead to better decision making for the bank.