The federal government has a history of assisting businesses when a crisis occurs, but one of its latest interventions may have created risk for bank partners providing aid.
Most recently, the CARES Act’s Paycheck Protection Program, commonly called PPP, helped businesses affected by Covid-19 by providing forgivable loans if, among other things, a company used the funds for “payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities” and used at least 60% of the amount forgiven on payroll. The program’s rocky rollout came during an extremely turbulent time, so it should surprise no one that disgruntled applicants and agents have filed a series of class action lawsuits with similar patterns of claims and allegations.
The first PPP class action lawsuits were filed against Bank of America Corp. and Wells Fargo & Co. in early April. In both cases — Profiles v. Bank of America Corp. and Scherer v. Wells Fargo Bank — the plaintiffs alleged the banks improperly restricted access to PPP loans to customers with a pre-existing banking relationship. Per this theory, the banks favored established, pre-existing clients in order to receive larger fees from larger loans at the expense of new customers.
Critically, in Profiles, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin Bank of America from imposing eligibility restrictions. Specifically, the court held that no express or implied private right of action exists under the PPP, and that only the Small Business Administration could file a civil suit for alleged violations of the PPP. The district court determined the alleged conduct was allowed, stating “[t]he statutory language does not constrain banks such that they are prohibited from considering other information when deciding from whom to accept applications, or in what order to process applications it accepts.”
Recognizing issues with asserting claims directly under the CARES Act, another group of class action plaintiffs brought claims under state law theories in separate cases against Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co, U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo in California federal court. These plaintiffs assert that the banks prioritized applications for large loans to generate higher fees in violation of California’s Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws and engaged in common law fraudulent concealment. The law firms that led the California class actions have filed suits under similar theories in New York against JPMorgan.
Utilizing different theories, class plaintiffs in California argue lenders are failing to process PPP loan applications on a first-come, first-served basis, as purportedly expected by the SBA. In Outlet Tile Center v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, the plaintiffs claimed Chase solicited applications from more-favored clients, making it impossible for the others to obtain loans. Even though there is no express requirement applications be processed on a first-come, first-served basis, plaintiffs claim they gave up opportunities to get loans from institutions that took applications as they came because of their pending applications with Chase. Suits employing this theory were also filed in New York, Illinois and Texas.
Espousing novel-market theories under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, plaintiffs in Legendary Transport v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. allege lenders conspired to only provide PPP loans to their larger clients as a way to “protect their market share and to limit competition” with respect to PPP funds. That suit also accuses JPMorgan of negligence and misrepresentation in connection with its PPP application process.
Finally, loan seekers are not the only class action plaintiffs seeking relief. Parties purporting to be agents assisting clients with applying for PPP loans are also seeking compensation. Cases in Florida and Ohio assert, despite CARES Act fee requirements, agents including accountants, attorneys, consultants and loan brokers who helped businesses prepare and submit applications are not being paid. These suits allege banks are not properly processing agent fees, intentionally failing to process loans that refer to an agent and/or directing applicants to online portals that do not allow customers to designate an agent.
All of these suits are still in their early stages, and some may be abandoned now that additional PPP funds have been made available and named plaintiffs may have received funds. Nonetheless, class action theories and new targets will evolve and emerge over time. In defending these suits, banks will likely rely upon “no private right of action” rulings, the lack of specific process requirements (as opposed to statutory guidance) and, in cases when only state law actions are pled, federal preemption. Importantly, financial institutions that evaded the first strike of class action litigation should prepare for future attacks utilizing the same or very similar theories of liability.
Participation in 401(k) plans has grown astronomically since they came into existence almost 30 years ago. Today, tens of millions of employees participate in 401(k) plans, and total assets under management exceed $7 trillion. It is little wonder that 401(k) plans have increasingly become targets for litigation over the last decade. In 2017 alone, dozens of new cases were filed against 401(k) plans, with settlements collectively exceeding $145 million. Litigation has also extended to substantively similar 403(b) plans. It is therefore important for plan sponsors and administrators to be aware of recent litigation trends and take appropriate steps to minimize litigation risks.
A troubling litigation trend in recent years has been the surge in lawsuits related to mergers and acquisitions. My first introduction to this phenomenon came in 2011 while representing a publicly traded bank in the Southeast that sold to a larger, stronger in-state buyer. Within an hour of announcing the deal, multiple class action lawsuits were filed in a variety of different states. Proponents of these suits contended that the sale process was flawed and that directors breached their fiduciary duties by not maximizing shareholder value. They cited the existence of restrictive deal protections that discouraged additional bids and conflicts of interest, such as change-of-control payments as well as insufficient disclosure in the proxy statement. The suit in 2011 was eventually settled with the selling shareholders receiving “beefed-up” disclosure with no increase in consideration. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, however, were awarded significant fees. These suits have become a given in virtually all transactions involving public sellers, including very small transactions. While essentially none of these lawsuits seem to have any true merit, they must be dealt with and settled in order to avoid costly and protracted litigation, including the risk of injunction that could block a deal.
The question of whether a bank should settle when hit with a lawsuit in connection with an M&A deal, and if so when, depends heavily on the circumstances. The reality is, however, that these shareholder class action suits are essentially a given in any transaction involving a publicly traded seller. In nearly all cases, regardless of the circumstances, the plaintiffs’ lawyers will assert, first, that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the sales process that was followed and in accepting the deal terms that were agreed and, two, that the disclosure in the proxy statement issued in connection with the shareholder meeting to approve the transaction is deficient. A well advised board will be aware of this reality and plan accordingly. As a practical matter, these suits rarely are an impediment to a transaction and should certainly not dissuade a board from pursuing a transaction that is in the best interests of the shareholders.
Like so many questions the answer lies in the particular facts and circumstances. But the automatic inclination to settle these strike suits has dissipated somewhat as management, and more importantly judges, have shown less patience with these types of suits, and as a consequence, awarded increasingly nominal amounts of attorney fees, if any at all. This cottage industry of the plaintiffs’ bar grew up in the era of large bank mergers where these types of suits and settlement amounts were viewed simply as mere nuisances. As the transactional activity has moved to the smaller bank market, so have the plaintiffs lawyers. But these suits have also taken on greater meaning for middle market transactions. The CEO of a bank that intends to engage in multiple acquisitions should seriously consider contesting the first strike suit to send the signal to the plaintiffs’ bar that this bank will not be easy prey.
While these actions ostensibly seek monetary relief, such as an increase in the merger consideration, most of them ultimately settle on terms that call for some additional disclosures to the shareholders in advance of the vote on the transaction, and, of course, an attorney’s fee award for the plaintiffs’ lawyers. There are two primary reasons for these settlements. First, the risk, however small, of having a large transaction enjoined or otherwise disrupted is often seen as outweighing the relatively minimal nature of the settlement relief. Second, a settlement is not without its benefits, as, once approved by the court, the settling defendants can obtain a full and complete release of any claims that were or could have been brought by the shareholders in connection with the merger transaction.
Unfortunately, settling these suits is a necessary evil. Judges are often reluctant to dismiss shareholder suits on the basis of a pre-trial motion, so settling is the only way to avoid the risk of an injunction that blocks the deal or the expense of litigating through trial. Refusing to settle and hoping the plaintiff goes away is probably more of a gamble than the parties are willing to take. The good news is that judges are beginning to doubt the value of many of these disclosure-only settlements in which the companies agree to provide additional disclosure to shareholders, and they are knocking down the attorney’s fees. Reducing the fees that accompany these settlements is the best way to discourage these questionable suits.
The decision to settle depends, in part, on the nature and size of the deal. Why settle an unmeritorious lawsuit? The threat of delaying a merger transaction can kill the deal, so settling by agreeing to provide some additional disclosures, paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and making a token payment to shareholders often makes sense. Acquirers often factor this so-called merger tax into their purchase price considerations to assure that the transaction gets completed. Be careful, though—paying the merger tax can result in higher future directors and officers (D&O) insurance premiums, or larger retentions under those policies. On the other hand, some acquirers in states with favorable business judgment statutes and a reasonable judiciary are fighting unmeritorious lawsuits. Those challenges show an impressive win-loss ratio for boards. Also encouraging is that some courts have dismissed the suits outright or refused to approve settlements and the attorneys’ fees provided in them.