What Silicon Valley Bank’s Failure Means for Incentive Compensation

The day Silicon Valley Bank failed on March 10, the bank paid out millions in bonuses to senior executives for its 2022 performance, according to the Federal Reserve’s April postmortem analysis and the bank’s proxy statement. Those bonuses were paid despite ongoing regulatory issues, including a May 2022 enforcement action.

As details trickle out about Silicon Valley Bank’s and Signature Bank’s failures, it’s becoming clear that regulators are interested in greater regulation and scrutiny of incentive plans. 

Among key risk management gaps, Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Michael Barr found fault in Silicon Valley Bank’s board compensation committee, noting that holding company SVB Financial Group’s “senior management responded to the incentives approved by the board of directors; they were not compensated to manage the bank’s risk, and they did not do so effectively.” Further, he wrote in the Fed’s April report: “We should consider setting tougher minimum standards for incentive compensation programs and ensure banks comply with the standards we already have.” 

It’s likely that supervisors will revisit examinations for banks between $50 billion and $250 billion in assets, which received regulatory relief following the 2018 rollback, says Todd Leone, a partner at the compensation firm McLagan. But supervisors recognized deficiencies in SVB’s incentive compensation governance prior to its failure, Barr revealed. Changes — via legislation and enhanced supervision — may occur, along with the finalization of incentive compensation and clawback rules coming out of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. 

Following the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, lawmakers including U.S. Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., urged regulators to finalize Section 956 of Dodd-Frank, which requires regulators to issue rules for institutions above $1 billion in assets around the prohibition of excessive incentive compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks, and mandate disclosure of incentive compensation plans to a bank’s federal regulator. Leone says that the rule was proposed with credit risk in mind, but its application could be expanded to consider liquidity.

The agencies tasked with this joint rulemaking, which include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Reserve, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, issued a request for comment on a proposed rule in 2016.

For public banks, the SEC finally released its clawback rule tied to Dodd-Frank in 2022. Put simply, the rule will require public companies to adopt policies that allow for the recovery of compensation in certain scenarios, including earnings restatements. The policy must be disclosed. Troutman Pepper expects that companies will have to comply as early as August. Gregory Parisi, a partner at the law firm, believes additional scrutiny on clawback policies will trickle down through the industry to smaller banks.

Clawback policies should cover numerous scenarios. “If the only triggers you have are tied to financial restatements, then it’s probably not broad enough,” says Daniel Rodda, a partner at Meridian Compensation Partners.

U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., and U.S. Rep. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., introduced legislation on March 29 that would authorize the FDIC to claw back compensation when a bank fails.

Beyond the Dodd-Frank rules, banks should consider how to strengthen their governance practices to better tie compensation to risk. “… Incentive compensation arrangements should be compatible with effective risk management and controls,” wrote Barr in April, citing the 2010 Interagency Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies. Those arrangements “should be supported by strong corporate governance practices, including active and effective oversight by boards of directors,” he added.

Barr also pointed out that SVB’s compensation committee didn’t receive performance evaluation materials from CEO Greg Becker, relying instead on his recommendations. 

“There can be times where [the board relies] on a verbal discussion around performance with the CEO,” says Rodda, “but having it documented in the materials and making sure that those performance evaluation materials include commentary from risk as part of the performance evaluation, those are certainly good processes to have in place.”

SVB said risk management was a “key component of compensation decisions” in its proxy statement filed on March 3, just days before the bank’s failure, but listed return on equity, total shareholder return and stock price appreciation as specific measurements for 2022 incentive payments. 

Rodda recommends that boards consider a combination of metrics that include capital ratios and risk-adjusted returns — not just profitability and growth — and incorporate qualitative approaches that could consider feedback from regulators and an overall view of risk management.

On May 31, 2022, supervisors flagged SVB’s incentive compensation process as a Matter Requiring Immediate Attention (MRIA) by the board, ordering the compensation committee to develop “mechanisms to hold senior management accountable for meeting risk management expectations.” SVB’s compensation committee was in the process of changing its incentive structure and approved bonuses in January 2023 that were paid out in March despite the bank’s dramatic deposit loss, according to the Barr report. 

“There should be a structured opportunity within the incentive program to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management,” says Rodda. “And if there are items that have been flagged by the regulators as critical and indicate that risk is not being managed well, then the committee should use its judgment to impact payouts based on that.”

Compensation issues like these will be covered during Bank Director’s Bank Board Training Forum in Nashville, Sept. 11-12, 2023.

This article was updated to correct a reference to Section 956.

Fifth Third’s Transformation

A few years ago, walls of black granite lined the entrance to Fifth Third Bancorp’s headquarters in downtown Cincinnati. Today, the entrance is an open atrium lined with artwork, a café and a small stage for the public to enjoy performances. Pithy reminders for employees dot the walls and elevator: “Be the bank people most value & trust,” and “Strengthen communities.”

As if to imply that the dark days at Fifth Third are behind it, a wall of windows lets light stream in. Fifth Third not only went through a physical renovation, but a financial one as well. The $205 billion bank’s performance was in the bottom half of peers eight and nine years ago. It’s now in the top quartile. It’s rebuilt its balance sheet and its reputation after the financial crisis, when its stock plummeted to about $1 per share and its ability to survive as an independent entity was in question.

Today’s Fifth Third has accomplished a vast financial comeback as well as a digital transformation executed in part by former CEO Greg Carmichael and Tim Spence, who in July became the youngest CEO among the 20 largest commercial banks in the country.

“That was the major task of the last five, six years: Return the bank to a place where it had the right to flex its muscle a little bit and go achieve great outcomes,” says Fifth Third’s Chief Strategy Officer Ben Hoffman. “Now the question for Tim is, ‘What do you do with that?’”

As if to emphasize the changes, Spence decided our interview would not take place in a conference room. He moved us to the open-office innovation studio that shares the same floor as the executive suite inside Fifth Third’s headquarters tower on Fountain Square. “Those of us who are here today get to operate on a platform that’s going to allow us to think about growth,” Spence says in hushed tones, so as not to disturb the employees working on computers around us. “How do we grow the business organically?”

To understand what happened at Fifth Third, you have to go back in time. Although the bank traces its roots back to The Bank of the Ohio Valley in 1858, it really began growing considerably in the 1980s. Its formidable former CEO, George Schaefer Jr., a West Point graduate and Vietnam War veteran, ran the bank starting in the 1990s until 2007. He created a hard-driving sales culture and had a reputation for frugality.

One reporter described his office furniture as not so much antique as shopworn. He was religious about making sure every employee wore the iconic 5/3 pin on their lapels. One former employee told me the bank was so conservative that women weren’t allowed to wear pantsuits. But it was also one of the top performing banks in the country.

Boosted by a high stock price multiple, Schaefer went on a buying spree that enlarged the bank’s footprint. In the 1990s alone, Fifth Third bought 21 other banks. By 1999, the bank had 384 banking centers in Florida, Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky, according to the company.

“Back in the 1990s, Cincinnati had two of the most highly regarded banks in the country,” says R. Scott Siefers, managing director and equity analyst at Piper Sandler & Co. “It was Fifth Third and Star Bank, which is now part of U.S. Bancorp in Minneapolis … they both had high multiples. Fifth Third might trade at 20 or 25 times earnings and would buy these companies at say, 10 or 12 times earnings. The math just worked fabulously because of the disparity. These deals were so accretive to earnings.”

But some of the deals didn’t work out so well, and investors became more cautious on the company, Siefers says. The financial crisis of 2007-08 came along, and Fifth Third was hit hard. Although the bank didn’t get into subprime lending, management was caught off guard by the sheer loss of value in the real estate industry and the collapse of the mortgage market.

Also, what regulators and the public demanded of banks changed dramatically, remembers Kevin Kabat, who was CEO from 2007 to 2015. Becoming CEO in 2007 was less than ideal. Kabat recalls that he had one good quarter before the crisis hit.

“It was stressful, to say the least,” he says. “We were probably the second most picked-on company after [National City Corp.], which went out of business.”

Congress passed the largest financial law in decades, the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2010.

“[The crisis] broadened in a much bigger way the definition of success,” Kabat says. “In [earlier] days, there was only one thing that mattered; it was earnings per share, period. There was not a lot of conversation about much else … I think what really changed from that perspective was the definition of success. The regulators had a stronger opinion about success. Your customers had a strong opinion of success. Your politicians and community leaders had a much different perspective of what success meant. It created a three-dimensional viewpoint of success, where we were pretty one-dimensional before that.”

Kabat recapitalized the business, with then-Chief Operating Officer Carmichael, and focused on changing the culture and de-risking the balance sheet. “When I joined the company, it was clear that the sales orientation, the sales focus was the No. 1 focus,” Kabat says. “We changed it from a sales focus to a customer focus. It’s not just what the next product is; it’s how the customer feels. How do they judge us? What’s their loyalty? And we began to measure all those things.”

There’s at least one entity that doesn’t believe Fifth Third totally changed: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. As of press time, the bureau continues to litigate its 2020 lawsuit against Fifth Third that accuses the bank of imposing sales goals on employees that resulted in unauthorized account openings for several years following the financial crisis, similar to practices at Wells Fargo & Co. that gained attention in 2016. The CFPB accuses Fifth Third of failing to take adequate steps to detect and stop the practices, or remediate harmed consumers.

Fifth Third countered in public statements that those accounts involved less than $30,000 in improper charges that were waived or reimbursed years ago. The company currently does not have sales quotas or product-specific targets for retail employees, nor does it reward them for opening unauthorized accounts. “Starting in 2011 and 2012 and 2013, the measures we took since that point in time ensured we had a culture that put the customer at the center,” Spence says, adding that the company doesn’t comment on pending litigation.

It wasn’t just Fifth Third’s sales culture that was under the microscope. When Greg Carmichael arrived in 2015, the bank was in better shape, but it was trading at book value. Profitability was stoked by ownership of a payments business called Vantiv, but lots of investors discounted that value. Carmichael asked investors what they liked about Fifth Third and what they thought its issues or challenges were. Then, he and his management team studied banks that performed well through economic cycles, looking for their similarities. “Listen, it wasn’t rocket science,” says the matter-of-fact Carmichael, who is now executive chairman of the board. “You need a balance sheet that’s going to perform well when the credit cycle turns. You need a balance sheet that’s going to throw off strong returns, so you need to make sure you’re banking the right clients, and you have the full relationship. You need your fee businesses to be a larger portion of your business to offset low-rate environments.”

The management team committed to becoming a bank that would perform well through various interest rate environments and through the inevitable downturns. Carmichael and his team began to build larger fee income businesses, such as mortgages, capital markets and private banking. He committed the bank to quantifiable financial goals, such as return on tangible common equity and return on assets. “We communicated that strategy with financial targets, and we told our investors to hold us accountable, told our board to hold us accountable. And we also asked our employees to hold us accountable, hold themselves accountable for executing to this strategy. That was critical,” he says.

Still, investors weren’t always pleased. After Fifth Third announced the acquisition in 2018 of one of the larger banks in Chicago, MB Financial, for 2.8 times tangible book value, the stock price fell and didn’t recover fully until the end of 2019. “What they didn’t like is we paid a lot for it,” Carmichael says, “We proved them wrong … I would do that deal in a heartbeat at the same price again, and I wouldn’t bat an eye.”

The other thing Carmichael did was start building the bank’s portfolio of high-quality commercial and industrial loans in Texas and California, even in regions that didn’t have Fifth Third retail branches, says Christopher Marinac, director of research for Janney Montgomery Scott, who follows the company. The management team has been focused particularly on expanding the bank and its branches into growth markets in the Southeast.

The focus has paid off so far. Fifth Third placed No. 5 among the 33 commercial banks above $50 billion in assets in Bank Director’s RankingBanking study last year, based on return on average assets, return on average equity, capital adequacy, asset quality and one-year total shareholder return in 2021. For calendar year 2020, it was building reserves for the pandemic and ranked No. 21 on a similar Bank Director ranking called the Bank Performance Scorecard. For calendar year 2019, it ranked sixth.

After Carmichael transformed the bank, he handed the reins to Spence last summer. But before that, he had executed a two-year succession plan that involved rotating Spence through different roles to see if he could lead major businesses for the bank, bringing him to investor meetings and signifying to the world that Spence was his likely successor. “So, when I actually made the announcement [that] I was stepping down in a handful of months, there was no surprise who the person was, there was no issue with confidence that Tim couldn’t step right in, because he’s been part of [the] strategy,” Carmichael says. The choice was unusual. Instead of picking someone as a potential successor who had 20 or 30 years of service in banking, Carmichael picked someone he had hired from the consulting firm Oliver Wyman as his chief strategy officer in 2015, when Spence was still in his 30s. “He was much younger than I thought he was,” Carmichael says. “But he is well beyond his years in both maturity and leadership, and knowledge base of the banking sector. So, I never thought of Tim as a young man. I always thought of him as a seasoned leader.”

Spence was an unusual pick for another reason. He had a background in the tech sector. Spence learned how to code at the same time he learned how to write, in the first grade, although he never worked as a programmer.

The son of a financial advisor and a flight attendant who divorced, he wasn’t sure what he wanted to do. He grew up in Portland, Oregon, and got a bachelor’s degree in economics and English literature from Colgate University, a private school in New York. While in school, he asked his dad to send him a copy of an Oregon business journal and wrote letters to the paper’s list of the 50 fastest growing tech companies, offering to work for free if there was a possibility of long-term employment. He started out at a small startup as a finance intern, working his way up in corporate development and management before moving to a bigger tech company. But after years at tech firms, he reached a point where he would “sit and listen to our customers, and hear them describe big opportunities and challenges. We were this little component solution. I wanted to have the opportunity to help work on the big things, not just the pieces.”

He got a job at Oliver Wyman and worked there for about a decade, becoming a senior partner of its financial services practice and doing work for its client Fifth Third before Carmichael offered him a job. Given the costs of hiring a consulting firm, Carmichael joked at the time that the hire was a money-saving measure. “He’s very thoughtful in his approach,” Carmichael says. “He [is] very detail oriented when he gets into a subject matter, and he can go very deep, which I was really, really impressed with. And then his listening skills, he listens and that’s also not a trait many consultants have.”

Carmichael says that when he decided to develop Spence as the potential next CEO, he was looking for someone who really understood technology’s impact on financial services. “He really had appreciation for the technology space and a passion for leveraging technology for the success of our business,” Carmichael says. “And I just thought that was also an extremely important attribute and skill set to have, when you think about the future of a bank CEO.”

Spence has a round, boyish face, but he’s tall enough to be a basketball player. Moving through the open offices, employees stopped what they were doing to watch him walk past. “Tim’s mind is all over the place, and I don’t mean in a sloppy, disorganized way,” says Steve D’Amico, who worked for Spence as chief innovation officer for a year and a half, starting in 2016. “He’s a very diverse thinker, bringing lots of unusual ideas to bear.”

Ben Hoffman, Fifth Third’s chief strategy officer, says that Spence has the ability to identify what matters and what doesn’t. “My belief is that Tim’s superpower is focus,” Hoffman says. He’s not a micromanager, but he’s deeply interested in the details. “There have been multiple times where he’s asked me a question about footnote seven on page 87, in the appendix of a presentation.”

One of the details Spence is intensely interested in is the particulars of digital transformation. Spence wants to learn from the best examples of technology and customer service across all industries, not necessarily in banking. “If we need engineers, what does the best employer for an engineer look like?” Hoffman says. “We spend a lot more time thinking about JPMorgan [Chase & Co.] and Goldman Sachs [Group] and LendingClub [Corp.], and the credit funds, candidly, then we do about the traditional regional bank peers.” A few years ago, the bank designed a new consumer deposit account. The walls were filled with sticky notes as staffers wrote down the best brands for customer experiences, among them, Delta Air Lines, Hertz, Domino’s Pizza and Zappos.com.

Then, they came up with ideas about what the app should do, Hoffman says.

Chief Digital Officer Melissa Stevens was deeply involved in launching the bank’s Momentum Banking consumer deposit account product in 2021, all of it built in-house. Notably, it’s not called a checking account. It has an automatic savings tool and free access to wages up to two days in advance with direct deposit, even for gig workers. The account also gives customers additional time to make a deposit to avoid overdrafts and the ability to get an advance of funds against future pay. It has no minimum deposit opening amount, and it costs $0 per month.

Although none of those features are hugely unique in the world of fintechs, what is unique is Fifth Third’s approach to fintech partnerships. Fifth Third is a superregional bank with a tech budget of more than $700 million last year, growing at a compound annual rate of 10%. “They’re not going to have the technology budget of a Chase or a Bank of America [Corp.],” says Alex Johnson, creator of the Fintech Takes newsletter. “And they can’t keep up with those banks if they insist on building everything themselves. But if they can focus their own development resources just on the things that they can’t get by partnering or buying, they can have a much more efficient technology budget where they get more per dollar out of their tech budget because it’s more focused on the highest priorities.” That’s not easy to do, because it’s hard to tell a chief technology officer not to build what that person wants to build, Johnson adds. “I think Fifth Third, for the most part, has managed to sidestep that problem from of an internal politics perspective and just be really aligned from the top down on what their strategy is,” he says.

Fifth Third works with fintech partners for years before it decides, in some cases, to buy them. Hoffman’s team is responsible for venture capital funding and partnerships with fintechs. The bank was an early investor in 2018, for example, in Provide, a digital lending platform for medical practices, according to a 2022 article by Bonnie McGeer for Bank Director’s FinXTech.com division. The bank announced a deal to buy Provide in 2021 and purchased another fintech that finances solar panels in 2022. “I think the other competency you have to have if you’re going to do this well is you have to be really good at partnering and acquiring technology,” Johnson says. “Some of the best technology out there is coming from fintech companies, and most banks have no idea how to work with fintech companies.”

Spence’s job is to get the company’s managers and employees to think differently, and he sees working with fintechs as part of that strategy. “The single best way to do that,’’ he says, was to partner with and invest in fintechs who could help the bank’s employees grow. “One of the big mental model changes that has to still trickle into our industry is this idea of product life cycle management … [Instead of] build it and launch it and leave it, we have to move much more into a software-oriented mindset, where you develop a product and then every six to 12 months, you make it better.”

Spence acknowledges that he’s in an enviable position compared to his predecessors. He was handed a banking franchise in good shape and now needs to sustain it. “What Greg did was remarkable,” Spence says. “We need to continue the focus on profitability and operational excellence and resilience through cycles. We need to maintain those disciplines. We need to grow organically and take advantage of opportunities, particularly in terms of technology that allows us to inhabit a different position in people’s lives.”

Despite the focus on innovation, analysts such as Siefers get the impression that Spence is equally focused on careful, strategic thinking when it comes to the bank’s balance sheet. He doesn’t get the impression that Fifth Third is interested in big gambles, and the bank seems well positioned even heading into a potential downturn.

“Kevin [Kabat] and then Greg Carmichael, they’ve been in reputation rebuild mode for the better part of the last decade,” Siefers says. “And they’ve done so quite successfully, particularly during Greg’s tenure. And ideally, that continuity will continue with Tim.”

Marinac also thinks the bank is well positioned given rising rates. “I think their ability to reset loan yields is better than other banks,” he says. “The industry is craving new ideas, new approaches, whether it’s taking out costs or building these new lending channels, or kind of rethinking the business. That’s where Tim comes in … 85% of banks follow and 15% lead. I think Fifth Third is demonstrating that they’re a leader.”

This article has been updated to reflect that Tim Spence was a senior partner in the financial services practice at Oliver Wyman.

The following feature appeared in the first quarter 2023 edition of Bank Director magazine. It and other stories are available to magazine subscribers and members of Bank Director’s Bank Services Membership Program. Learn more about subscribing here.

Regulators Are Back: What to Watch in Compensation Plans

After taking more than a decade to finalize pay-for-performance compensation rules, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission now expects companies to take about six months to comply with them. 

“There will be a lot of computers blowing up in the next several months,” says Todd Leone, a partner at the compensation consulting firm McLagan, an Aon company. “There’s a lot of eye-rolling that we didn’t have much time to do this.” 

Leone was speaking to a group of more than 250 human resources professionals, directors and industry leaders attending Bank Director’s Bank Compensation and Talent Conference, taking place November 8 through 9 in Dallas. The new SEC disclosure rule is one of a host coming down the pipeline for publicly traded companies. Leone says the agency introduced 26 new proposals so far in 2022, the highest it has been in five years. 

“It’s turned into quite a big to-do,” says Susan O’Donnell, a partner at Meridian Compensation Partners, who also spoke about the pay-for-performance regulation on stage. 

After years of little activity finalizing what languished in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, regulators under President Joe Biden have taken renewed interest in adopting rules that will impact a broad swath of mostly public companies. In 2015, the SEC first proposed rules to require companies to disclose more about the relationship between executive pay and performance. In August, the SEC adopted the rules, which go into effect for fiscal years ending on or after December 16, 2022. In other words, most public banks will be required to provide the new disclosures starting in the 2023 proxy season. Smaller reporting companies are subject to scaled disclosure requirements. 

“I think that this rule will help investors receive the consistent, comparable, and decision-useful information they need to evaluate executive compensation policies,” SEC Chair Gary Gensler said in a statement at the time. O’Donnell says companies will have to report executive compensation alongside financial performance metrics, including total shareholder return, as well as TSR of a peer group, net income and a financial performance metric chosen by the company. In all, the company will be required to report three to seven financial performance metrics. 

This could cause problems for banks that complete M&A deals, Leone says. Typically, net income falls after an acquisition because of one-time expenses. At the same time, compensation increases, sometimes to motivate the executive team to make the deal a success. He recommends banks include a description in the disclosure that describes why pay and performance may not appear to align.

“Institutional investors aren’t looking at this to tell them anything they don’t already know,” Leone says. “The one area where we’re scratching our heads is what are the plaintiffs’ lawyers going to do. You have to make sure there’s a story behind this and a narrative that you’re telling.” The first year, Leone says companies will have to disclose three fiscal years of compensation metrics, so he advises companies to get started now on 2020 and 2021 calculations. Each year, another year will be added, until companies report five years’ worth of data. 

Companies will have more time to comply with the other recently finalized disclosure rule required by the Dodd-Frank Act, this one having to do with clawing back incentive compensation that was granted in error. Leone referred to the rule as “lovely bedtime reading for those of you with insomnia,” because it encompasses more than 200 pages

In October, the SEC finalized the rule that had first been proposed in 2015 requiring companies to disclose their policies regarding clawing back compensation from named executives. Usually, those clawbacks occur due to restatements of earnings or misconduct. Although the rule doesn’t say that clawbacks must occur for misconduct, the rule does require companies to claw back compensation that was based on erroneous calculations, regardless of whether the executive was at fault for the error. Leone expects the rule to go into effect later in 2023. Smaller reporting companies do have to comply with this one. 

And the third disclosure rule coming down the pike for public companies is Nasdaq’s new board diversity rule. Laura Hay, lead consultant for Meridian Compensation Partners, says the exchange will require companies to have at least one diverse director starting in 2023 and two starting in 2025, or explain why they don’t have them. Diversity may include gender or underrepresented minorities, as well as LGBTQ individuals.

The exchange also requires that companies include a diversity matrix in their disclosures, which went into effect in August for the next proxy season.

Recent Developments to Combat Redlining

Regulators have worked on a variety of anti-redlining proposals in recent months, including a joint initiative by the Department of Justice, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

These proposals come in tandem with recent initiatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission to increase the emphasis on ESG factors, a set of non-financial environmental, social and governance factors that publicly filed companies can use to identify material risks and growth opportunities.

Though anti-redlining legislation initially came into law when Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977, it has recently seen a refocus in the Combatting Redlining Initiative led by the DOJ Civil Rights Division’s Housing and Civil Enforcement Section. During Acting Comptroller Michael Hsu’s initial unveiling of this initiative, he highlighted the importance of providing “fair and equitable access to credit — to everyone” in order to build wealth among minority and underrepresented groups. He emphasized that modern redlining, as compared to its 20th century predecessor, is “often more subtle, harder to detect, and resource-intensive to find.”

Initial reactions to the initiative expected it to focus on the redlining seen in the Trustmark Corp. settlement, where the Jackson, Mississippi-based bank discriminated against Black and Hispanic neighborhoods by “deliberately not marketing, offering, or originating home loans to consumers in majority Black and Hispanic neighborhoods in the Memphis metropolitan area,” according to the CFPB. The $17.6 billion bank settled for a $5 million penalty.

But in recent weeks, though a final rule is not yet in place, the acting comptroller made it clear the focus is not only on direct discrimination, but also on indirect discrimination through climate redlining. Climate redlining occurs when certain minority communities are subject to heightened climate change risks based on where they are located; those heightened risks pose a disproportionate impact on minority groups.

Though official rules have yet to be proposed related to the policies, banks can take the following actions in preparation:

1. Review any neutral algorithms used in the lending process. Redlining is not always overt; it may be a byproduct of algorithms that appear neutral on the surface but disproportionately target minority communities based on targeting certain income brackets, risk factors or the demographic compensation of the surrounding area. Bankers should make time to carefully review the factors being input into their institution’s algorithms and consider whether those factors might create inadvertent bias.

2. Review any policies related to geographic filtering. Minority groups are disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change; this disparate impact is expected to grow as the frequency of climate events increases. Rising water, more frequent fires and extreme weather events are all examples of events some banks might choose to geographically exclude in order to keep lending risk portfolios low. But by filtering out these events and impacts, banks may be inadvertently redlining. Banks should take the time to carefully examine any exclusions they make based on geography or weather history in preparation of any final rules, and compare them to demographic information on the bank’s lending practices.

3. Review branch locations. One of the reasons regulators found Trustmark to have engaged in redlining practices was its lack of branch locations in majority Black and Hispanic communities. This meant that not only were those residents not able to receive banking services, they also were not being marketed to when it came to potential lending opportunities. Banks should review the footprints of their branches relative to the demographics in the cities in which they are located to determine whether they are over- or under-represented in certain demographics.

4. Public bank holding companies should review ESG factors. With both proxy season and annual filing season upon publicly traded companies, now is a good time for publicly traded bank holding companies to evaluate their current treatment of environmental, social and governance risks. If a bank identifies that it may be inadvertently engaging in redlining, the affiliated bank holding company should carefully think through potential disclosures.

When to Form a Risk Committee

Should your board form a standing risk committee — and how will you know that the time is right?

Federal law requires all depository institutions to establish a standing board-level risk committee once they reach $50 billion in assets. The requirement dates back to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010; the original asset threshold was set at $10 billion but raised to $50 billion when some of Dodd-Frank’s provisions were relaxed in 2018.

Not every bank waits until it reaches $50 billion to form a risk committee. Many boards make that decision when their bank is much smaller, generally in reaction to its growing size and complexity. In my experience, smaller banks tend to handle risk oversight through their audit committee. But as a bank grows by expanding geographically, adding new business lines or diversifying its loan portfolio — and sometimes doing all of these things at once — its risk profile changes. There is simply more to keep track of — more that can go wrong — and it becomes appropriate to assign the job of risk oversight to a dedicated committee.

In my opinion, once a bank becomes large and complex enough that risk oversight shouldn’t be juggled with audit committee issues like overseeing the external audit or ensuring the integrity of the bank’s financial statements (if it’s a public company), having a dedicated risk committee becomes a best practice.

“When the materials, when the content, when the conversations get more complex and more involved — that’s when I tend to see audit committees split apart into a pure audit committee and a board risk committee,” says Ryan Luttenton, a partner at the consulting firm Crowe LLP. “It’s when the complexities of the institution become a little more challenging to manage in the context of just one meeting. When you start to push things into consent agendas, and you’re approving things and the list starts to grow and grow, it becomes a question of, are we doing a disservice to the institution by not having more constructive discussions around risk and strategy in a risk committee?

BankNewport, a $2.3 billion mutual bank subsidiary of OceanPoint Financial Partners, opted to form a risk committee in 2016 when it was just $1.4 billion. According to risk committee chair James Wright, the Newport, Rhode Island-based bank was beginning to expand beyond Aquidneck Island, an island in Narragansett Bay that contains Newport and surrounding towns, to the rest of Rhode Island. The bank was also beginning to expand its lending focus to include commercial real estate, an inherently riskier asset class.

Previously, the BankNewport board had not assigned risk oversight to its audit committee, but instead handled it in a compliance and trust committee. The board ended up reconstituting that committee as a standing risk committee. “I think it was a variety of things that led us to doing that,” says Wright. “Our credit portfolio was shifting from more of a residential focus to more commercial. It wasn’t dramatic, but the balance was starting to shift. We were taking on more of a geographic footprint. It really was time to create a more enterprise-wide, strategically focused risk committee that would look at all risk as connected entities.”

There are seven members on the bank’s risk committee, including the board chair and CEO, and it meets quarterly. Around the same time that it created the committee, BankNewport also hired its first chief risk officer to build out a more comprehensive, enterprise-wide risk management process at the bank level. Wright believes the board’s decision to form a risk committee, combined with stronger risk management practices at the bank level, has greatly improved the quality of its risk oversight. “Now, there’s a more centralized place for everyone to go and say, ‘What are we doing about this? What are our protections? What are our proactive measure we’re taking on these things?’”

Another bank that made a decision to bring a sharper focus to risk governance is Glacier Bancorp, a $21.3 billion asset regional bank in Kalispell, Montana. According to committee chair Annie Goodwin, the bank had approximately $5 billion in assets when it formed a risk oversight committee in 2012. Obviously, this was well under the $10 billion threshold that had been established by Dodd-Frank, but the bank wanted to be ready when it got there.

Even though we’re not at the $50 billion asset threshold presently … our board has made the decision to maintain the risk oversight committee,” Goodwin says. Nine of Glacier’s 11 directors sit on the committee, and its risk oversight officer reports directly to the committee and provides it with monthly reports.

“The risk oversight committee provides a disciplined structure to ensure that we are conducting enterprise risk management in a comprehensive manner,” says Goodwin. “So many areas of the bank’s functions and operations are encompassed in the oversight of our committee that I don’t think our board could ever go back and not have a risk oversight process again.”

Although bank regulators rarely mandate that banks below the $50 billion threshold form a risk committee, they often begin to have conversations with banks under their supervision about adopting more robust enterprise risk management practices at the bank level when they approach the $5 billion mark, according to Luttenton. “And then, as you get to $8 billion, what I hear from my clients and feedback from some of the regulators is that they kind of come in and do a light touch,” he says. “They start to set some expectations around enterprise risk and things like model risk management and vendor management.” Regulation generally becomes tougher when a bank passes the $10 billion mark, and the regulators want a strong risk management program in place by then.

And if the bank is beefing up its risk management policies and practices at the bank level, it may make sense for the board to focus its risk governance efforts in a dedicated committee.

Goodman is a former regulator who served as Montana’s Commissioner of Banking and Financial Institutions from 2001 to 2010. She believes that even small community banks can benefit from bringing a more focused approach to risk governance by setting up a dedicated committee.

“For all banks that are sitting on the sidelines with whether or not they should implement an enterprise risk management committee, my advice is to get started soon,” she says. “And even if it’s a very simple process, it’s always easier to implement a program when the bank is small, rather than waiting until it gets much larger in asset size and much more complex in its operations. I think even with a smaller community bank, enterprise risk management can get into the board’s DNA, their way of thinking that prepares them for the future and to help the bank with its long-term success.”

Brian Nappi, a senior manager at Crowe, says directors are often bogged down under the weight of too much information. “If I’m sitting on a risk committee and I have to look at more than nine pages to understand where we are, then we’re not good communicators,” he says. The first page should have four things, Nappi says: the risk appetite statement compared to the bank’s risk profile at the end of every quarter; the top three to five risks facing the bank; management’s response to those risks; and the top two or three emerging risks. The remaining eight pages should contain a variety of risk data if the committee members want to drill down deeper, he adds.

Generally speaking, risk committees should be forward-looking in their focus, while audit committees naturally look backward. This is why handling risk in the audit committee is something of a philosophical disconnect. When a bank forms a risk committee after its audit committee has been handling risk oversight, the audit committee still plays an important role in verifying that the bank’s various risk management policies are being followed.

“The focus for audit committees is on internal controls — which controls are working, and which ones are broken,” says Nappi. “Risk committees, their focus should be on what’s the highest residual risk [facing] the institution, and what [is] management’s response to those risks.”

You can view a sample risk committee charter here, part of our Board Structure Guidelines, which describe committee functions, structure and compensation, as well as board roles. These resources are available exclusively to Bank Services members.

Regulators Revive Efforts to Pass Dormant Compensation Rules

When it comes to incentive compensation, everything old is new again.

Financial regulators are expected to revive rulemaking on a number of compensation provisions that never went into effect but were mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.

Some of the issues that bank and securities regulators could consider in the coming quarters include measures that will gauge executive pay against their performance, as well as mandate clawback provisions and enhanced reporting around incentive compensation structures, said Todd Leone, a partner and global head of compensation at consulting firm McLagan. He was speaking during Bank Director’s 2021 Bank Compensation & Talent Conference, held Nov. 8 to Nov. 10 in Dallas.

All banks with more than $1 billion in assets would need to comply with the final version of the enhanced incentive compensation requirements. Public companies, including banks, would need to comply with any final rules around clawbacks and pay versus performance. If the topics sound familiar, Leone reminded the crowd, it was because they were debated when the banking reform bill initially passed in 2010. Regulators considered rulemaking several years later. But the move to finally pass those rules could catch banks off-guard, especially when considering that rulemaking was essentially paused under the administration of President Donald Trump. Below is Leone’s overview of the proposed rules.

Clawbacks
Clawback provisions, or a company’s ability to take back previously awarded pay or bonuses after a triggering event such as a restatement of earnings, were a hotly debated topic of the post-crisis financial reform bill more than a decade ago. They also came into focus in the bank space after news broke about the Wells Fargo & Co. fake account scandal in late 2016. In 2017, the bank’s board announced it would seek $75 million in previously awarded compensation from two of the senior executives that it held accountable for the scandal. In response, a number of banks created clawback policies of their own.

In October 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, under Chair Gary Gensler, reopened the comment period for the clawback provision, or Section 954 of the act. Leone pointed out that the proposed rule defines a triggering event as an accounting restatement for a material error. A company has up to three years to claw back incentive pay linked to the financial information that is restated; potentially impacted employees include current or former executive officers. Leone expected a final rule by the second half of 2022 but recommended that audience members stand pat until something is published.

“Don’t touch existing policies, since it’s in flux,” he recommended for banks that created their own policies.

Pay For Performance
Pay for performance, or Section 953(a), is a proposed disclosure requirement for public companies, including banks, that would most likely appear as a table in the proxy statement. The disclosure compares total shareholder return for a company against a company-selected peer group, along with compensation figures of a company’s top executives. The company would need to state the principal executive’s reported total compensation for the current year and past four years, along with the average reported total compensation for other named executive officers over the current year and past four years.

Like the clawback proposal, this provision was first debated by the SEC in 2015; it is in “final rule stage,” according to the agency, and Leone believed it could go into effect in the second half of 2022. The rule could create a “fair bit more work” for companies to comply with, he said. But he believed it will have a similar impact on the industry as the CEO pay ratio disclosure, which compares the pay of the CEO to that of the company’s median employee and has yet to lead to significant changes in pay for either group.

Incentive Compensation Rules
Similar to the other two proposals, the enhanced incentive compensation rule, or Section 956, has come up again. The SEC included it as a proposed rule in its agency rules list for spring 2021. Leone joked that he had used the same presentation slide on the enhanced incentive compensation rule a decade ago. The rule has been proposed by regulators twice since the passage of Dodd-Frank: It was 70 pages when it was first proposed in 2011 but had grown to 700 pages when it was re-proposed in 2016, he said.

Leone believed this rule will come up again in the spring of 2022, and that rulemaking will take some time because a number of regulators will need to collaborate on it. It would apply to all banks with more than $1 billion in assets, along with other financial institutions such as credit unions and broker dealers. The requirements would vary based on asset size, with the biggest firms facing the most stringent rules around their incentive compensation agreements. Under previous iterations of the rule, financial institutions would need to include provisions to adjust incentive compensation downward under certain circumstances, outline when deferred incentive compensation could be forfeited and build in a clawback period of seven years.

In the end, Leone recommends banks be proactive when it comes to changing compensation rules.

Expect more, not less regulation,” he said.

Once Stagnated, Banks Are Refreshing Checking Accounts to Compete

Once a staid and basic product offering, banks are reinvigorating consumer checking accounts.

A number of banks, taking a page from the challenger bank playbook, are adding features to their accounts to please consumers: early access to a direct-deposited paycheck, free overdraft and short-term loans. These changes attempt to match the offerings from financial technology platforms such as Chime and Current, which have been growing exponentially and attracting billions in venture capital funding.

The default consumer checking account is easy to take for granted. Most banks offer them without cost to customers in exchange for a deeper relationship such as a monthly direct deposit or a minimum balance. The hope is that a customer is profitable through noninterest fee income such as debit card interchange fees or through other products the bank can cross-sell to the customer.

But the Durbin amendment, part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, reduced interchange income for banks with more than $10 billion in assets. The Durbin amendment made checking accounts less profitable while digital account opening made it easier for consumers to open an account with a competitor. Checking accounts stagnated, says Alex Johnson, director of fintech research at Cornerstone Advisors. Joining the fray were online-only neobanks like Chime, Digit and Varo Bank, N.A., a fintech that received approval for a bank charter in July 2020 and now has $403 million in assets. They customized their checking accounts with valuable features to gain new customers — including customers willing to pay for some features.

Investments in digital are not the same as investments in deposits, but they were treated as the same a lot of times,” Johnson says. “Banks said ‘We’re keeping pace, we let people open up these accounts on their phone.’ That’s great, but … are you doing anything new to improve the value proposition there? The answer is no.”

Now, a number of banks are reconsidering their deposit offerings to drum up interest from new customers and deepen relationships with existing ones. Many of them leverage technology, require direct deposit information and are consumer friendly, helping customers avoid overdraft fees. Capital One Financial Corp. and SoFi Technologies— a fintech that has applied to acquire a community bank — offer access to direct deposits paychecks two days in advance, following Chime’s lead. Pittsburgh-based PNC Financial Services Group launched a feature called “Low Cash Mode” within its digital wallet in April; Columbus, Ohio-based Huntington Bancshares rolled out a cash advance product in June for checking account customers with a history of monthly deposits. The offering from the $125.8 billion bank takes a page from Varo’s Varo Advance product and is addition to the bank’s overdraft grace period. Ally Financial, which has $181.9 billion in assets, did away with overdraft fees altogether.

The intense focus on reinvesting in deposit products relates directly to the importance of primacy. Consumers define their primary bank as the institution that holds their checking account, versus the institution with the car loan or mortgage, says Mike Branton, a partner at StrategyCorps.* StrategyCorps works with banks to add services to checking accounts using a subscription model.

Measuring primacy — the number of households or customers that genuinely consider an institution to be their primary one — is hard for banks. Branton says many banks don’t have a set definition or use a definition based solely on banking behavior, such as account balance or debit card swipes; others look at the sheer number of other accounts linked to a checking account. StrategyCorps uses a financial definition for primacy that considers banking behavior and account activity in terms of revenue generation: Primary customers generate $350 or more a year for their bank.

That kind of revenue can be a tall order when banks have offered free checking for decades. Results from cross-selling may prove elusive. But free doesn’t have to be a showcased feature of checking accounts, especially if customers think the services and benefits are valuable. Digit, a fintech that helps customers save money by analyzing their spending and automatically moving funds when they can afford it, charges $5 a month. The fintech Current charges $4.99 per month for a premium account, which includes up to $100 in overdrafts and early access to direct deposits such as paychecks, a benefit for low- and moderate-income Americans who are living paycheck-to-paycheck.

“Products are more important than ever,” Branton says. “I think what banks are learning from the pandemic is that because people are not coming in the branch and experiencing the human touch as frequently, but are interacting with the banking product, they must make their products better than ever.”

*Bank Director founder Bill King is also a founding partner of StrategyCorps.

The Coming Buyback Frenzy

Capital planning is examined as part of Bank Director’s Inspired By Acquire or Be Acquired. Click here to access the content on BankDirector.com.

The banking industry hasn’t been this well capitalized in a long time. In fact, you have to go back to the 1940s — almost 80 years ago — before you find a time in history when the tangible common equity ratio was this high, says Tom Michaud, president and CEO of investment bank Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, during a presentation for Bank Director’s Inspired By Acquire or Be Acquired platform.

That ratio for FDIC-insured banks has nearly doubled since 2008, he says, reaching 8.5% as of Sept. 30, 2020, says Michaud.

A big part of the industry’s high levels of capital goes back to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the Congressional response to the financial crisis of 2008-09. Because of that law, banks must maintain new regulatory capital and liquidity ratios that vary based on their size and complexity.

During the pandemic, banks were in much better shape. You can see the impact by looking at the capital ratios of just a handful of big banks. Citigroup, for example, had a tangible common equity ratio in the third quarter of 2020 that was nearly four times what it was in 2008, Michaud says.

With a deluge of government aid and loans such as the Paycheck Protection Program, the industry’s losses during the pandemic have been minimal so far. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. has closed just four banks, far fewer than the deluge of failures that took place during the financial crisis. So far, financial institutions have maintained their profitability. Almost no banks that pay a dividend cut theirs last year.

Meanwhile, regulators required many of the large banks, which face extra scrutiny and stress testing compared to smaller banks, to halt share repurchases and cap dividends last year, further pumping up capital levels.

That means that banks have a lot of capital on their books. Analysts predict a wave of share repurchases in the months ahead as banks return capital to shareholders.

“The banking industry continues to make money,” said Al Laufenberg, a managing director at KBW, during another Bank Director session. “The large, publicly traded companies are coming out with statements saying, ‘We have too much capital.’”

Investors have begun to ask more questions about what banks are doing with their capital. “We see investors getting a little bit more aggressive in terms of questions,” he says. “‘What are you going to do for me?”

Bank of America Corp. already has announced a $2.9 billion share repurchase in the first quarter of 2021. In fact, KBW expects all of the nation’s universal and large regional banks to repurchase shares this year, according to research by analysts Christopher McGratty and Kelly Motta. They estimate the universal banks will buy back 7.3% of shares in 2021, while large regionals will buy back 3.5% of shares on average. On Dec. 18, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced those banks would again be allowed to buy back shares after easing earlier restrictions.

Regulators didn’t place as many restrictions during the pandemic on small- and medium-sized banks, so about one-third of them already bought their own stock in the fourth quarter of 2020, according to McGratty.

In terms of planning, banks that announce share repurchases don’t have to do them all at once, Laufenberg says. They can announce a program and then buy back stock when they determine the pricing is right.

Shareholders can benefit when banks buy back stock because that can reduce outstanding shares, increasing the value of individual shares, as long as banks don’t buy back stock when the stock is overvalued. Although bank stock prices compared to tangible book value and earnings have returned to pre-Covid levels, the KBW Regional Banking Index (KRX) has underperformed broader market indices during the past year, making an argument in favor of more repurchases.

Robert Fleetwood, a partner and co-chair of the financial institutions group at the law firm Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum & Nagelberg LLP, who spoke on the Bank Director session with Laufenberg, cautions bank executives to find out if their regulators require pre-approval. Every Federal Reserve region is different. Regulators want banks to have as much capital as possible, but Fleetwood says they understand that banks may be overcapitalized at the moment.

High levels of capital will help banks grow in the future, invest in technology, add loans and consolidate. For the short term, though, investors in bank stocks may be the immediate winners.

Recalibrating Bank Stress Tests to a New Reality

Any bank that stress tested its loan portfolios prior to the Covid-19 pandemic probably used a worst-case scenario that wasn’t nearly as bad as the economic reality of the last five months.

Stress tests are an analysis of a bank’s loans or revenue stream against a variety of adverse computer-generated scenarios. The results help management teams and their boards of directors gauge whether the bank has adequate reserves and capital to withstand loan losses of various magnitudes. One challenge for banks today that incorporate stress tests into their risk management approach is the lack of relevant historical data. There is little modern precedent for what has befallen the U.S. economy since March, when most of the country went into lockdown to try to flatten the pandemic’s infection rate. The shutdowns tipped the U.S. economy into its steepest decline since the Great Depression.

Does stress testing still have value as a risk management tool, given that we’re navigating in uncharted economic waters?

“I would argue absolutely,” says Jay Gallagher, deputy comptroller for systemic risk identification support and specialty supervision at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “It is not meant to be an exercise in perfection. It’s meant to say within the realm of possibility, these are the scenarios or variables we want to test against. Could we live with what the outcome is?”

The Dodd-Frank Act required banks with assets of $10 billion or greater to run annual stress tests, known as DFAST tests, and report the results to their primary federal regulator. The requirement threshold was raised to $100 billion in 2018, although Gallagher believes that most nationally chartered banks supervised by the OCC still do some form of stress testing.

They see value in the exercise and not having the regulatory framework around it makes it even more nimble for them to focus on what’s really important to them as opposed to checking all the boxes from a regulatory exercise,” says Gallagher. “We still see a lot of banks that used to have to do DFAST still use a lot of the key tenets in their risk management programs.”

Amalgamated Bank, a $5.8 billion state chartered bank headquartered in New York, has been stress testing its loan portfolios on an individual and macro level for several years even though it sits well below the regulatory threshold. For the first time ever, the bank decided to bring in an outside firm to do its own analysis, including peer comparisons.

President and CEO Keith Mestrich says it is as much a business planning tool as much as it is a risk mitigation tool. It gives executives insight into its loan mix and plays an important role in decisions that Amalgamated makes about credit and capital.

It tells you, are you going to have enough capital to withstand a storm if the worst case scenario comes true and we see these loss rates,” he says. “And if not, do you need to go out and raise additional capital or take some other measures to get some risk off the balance sheet, even if you take a pretty significant haircut on it?”

Banks that stress test have been forced to recalibrate and update their economic assumptions in the face of the economy’s sharp decline, as well as the government’s response. The unemployment rate spiked to 14.7% in April before dropping to 11.1% in June when the economy began to reopen, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. But the number of Covid-19 cases in the U.S. has surged past 3 million and several Western and Southern states are experiencing big increases in their infection rates, raising the possibility that unemployment might spike again if businesses are forced to close for a second time.

“I feel like the unemployment numbers are probably the most important ones, but they’re always set off by how the Covid cases go,” says Rick Childs, a partner at the consulting firm Crowe. “To the extent that we don’t get [the virus] back under control, and it takes longer to develop a vaccine and/or effective treatment options for it, I think they’ll always be in competition with each other.”

Another significant difference between the Great Recession and the current situation is the unparalleled level of fiscal support the U.S. Congress has provided to businesses, local governments and individuals through the $2 trillion CARES Act. It is unclear another round of fiscal support will be forthcoming later this year, which could also drive up the unemployment rate and lead to more business failures. These and other variables complicate the process of trying to construct a stress test model, since there aren’t clear precedents to rely on in modern economic history.

Stress testing clearly still has value despite these challenges, but Childs says it’s also important that banks stay close to their borrowers. “Knowing what’s happening with your customer base is probably going to be more important in terms of helping you make decisions,” he says.

Former CFPB Head on a Post-Pandemic Banking Industry

Banks across the country have been frontline responders in the unfolding economic crisis.

Many are offering forbearance and modifications to borrowers facing health emergencies or financial hardship. But they should take care not to assume business will get back to normal for their consumers, even as states reopen and economic activity thaws, says former CFPB Director Richard Cordray.

Cordray, the former Ohio Attorney General, headed up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau after its inception in the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act until his resignation in 2017. The sometimes-controversial agency focuses on consumers’ financial rights and protections; its jurisdiction extends to institutions above $10 billion in assets.

Bank Director recently spoke with Cordray after a COMPLY Summit Series webinar that he participated in about how banks can navigate customer relationships during and after the pandemic.

BD: This pandemic has led banks to roll out consumer-friendly policies, like waiving or suspending overdraft or late fees. Do you think these changes are permanent, or do you see them coming back?
RC: The fees have been put on hiatus at certain banks, but they’re still out there. It has been better practice for banks, during this crisis, to be very consumer friendly —  recognizing that, through what is clearly no fault of their own, many of their customers have been required to stay at home, their businesses have been shuttered and they don’t have income coming in — and give them a break.

BD: What should guide banks as they decide how to help consumers?
RC: At this point, I think the pressure on banks is mostly reputational. If banks are not perceived as serving their customers in involuntary distress well, they end up in trouble as a matter of public branding. There’s a certain normative effect on banks now, in the depths this crisis, that has nothing to do with what they’re legally allowed or not allowed to do.

If bank customers are going regain their footing in the future, shoving them into bankruptcy or financial ruin is not helpful and it’s not in the bank’s own interest. Reputational risk is a real and significant thing that banks have to think about. All you have to do is think about Wells Fargo and how their reputation has been damaged in recent years. Banks do not want to take on the brand of being a company that’s not sensitive to their customers.

BD: There have also been consumer-friendly practices coming out of the CARES act and different edicts from state government for moratoriums on evictions. How can financial institutions aid in these efforts?
RC: To the extent that banks hold car loans or mortgages [that aren’t subject to CARES Act relief], they have a judgment to make: Are they going to afford similar relief to their customers? Some are, some aren’t. If you’re holding auto loans, you can dictate that there will be no auto repossessions during this period. I think that would be by far the better practice.

BD: We’ve seen announcements from regulators encouraging banks to work with customers. Is there anything regulators or banks could be doing more of?
RC: I think it would make sense for mortgages holders to give forbearance to their customers, whether or not its mandated by the CARES Act. Foreclosure is a last resort. If we have a rash of foreclosures, they’re going to get tied up in the courts and it’ll be difficult for mortgage holders to foreclose quickly. They will start to suffer the loss of the abandoned and vacant houses that we saw during the last crisis, and that’s something to be avoided at all costs for them.

BD: Once we return to a more normal operating environment, I imagine many of these types of forbearance relief will go away. Do you have any thoughts about how banks can help customers through this transition?
RC: The wrong way to do this would be to say that debts accumulated over the course of the emergency orders need to be repaid all at once. That is not realistic and is not going to be successful. If people couldn’t make those payments during this period, they’re not going to have all that money suddenly to pay it just because we came to the end of this period. The result will be foreclosures, evictions and repossessions. The right thing to do is have that amount be repayable over time or put it on the back end of the loan.