2019 Survey Results: CEO and Board Pay Trends

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Today, more banks are tying their chief executive officers’ pay to performance indicators, as indicated by 80 percent of the directors and executives responding to Bank Director’s 2019 Compensation Survey, sponsored by Compensation Advisors. That’s up from 75 percent when Bank Director last posed the question, in 2015.

Most, at 59 percent, tie CEO compensation to their strategic plan or corporate goals.

But the metrics banks prefer vary according to their structure. Public banks are more apt to tie pay to performance—just 8 percent indicate they don’t do so—and tend to favor goals established in the strategic plan (72 percent), as well as metrics such as return on assets (58 percent), return on equity (53 percent) and efficiency (40 percent).

Among private banks, net income is the preferred metric, at 55 percent. Twenty-seven percent of respondents in this group say CEO compensation is not tied to performance.

The survey was conducted in April 2019, and includes the perspectives of more than 300 bank directors and executives—including chief executives and human resources officers—as well as data obtained from the proxy statements of more than 100 publicly traded banks.

It includes details about current CEO and director compensation packages—in the aggregate, and by asset size and ownership structure. The survey also focuses on succession planning and board refreshment.

Respondents indicate that their CEOs all received a salary in fiscal year 2018, at a median of $325,000; the median total compensation was $515,728. Paying a cash incentive (78 percent), and offering benefits and perks (75 percent) are also common forms of compensation throughout the industry. Less common are nonqualified deferred compensation or retirement benefits (49 percent) and equity grants (47 percent). However, payment of equity differs broadly based on the ownership of the bank: Almost three-quarters of respondents from public banks say their CEO received an equity grant last year.

Additional Findings

  • When asked how compensation for the CEO could be improved, 36 percent point to offering non-equity, long-term incentive compensation. Twenty-three percent believe the bank should offer equity at greater levels, and 21 percent say they should offer some form of ownership in the bank. Twenty-two percent believe the bank should pay a higher salary to the CEO.
  • The median age of a bank CEO is 58. Seventy percent are baby boomers, between the ages of 55 and 73.
  • Seventy-two percent believe the current CEO will remain at their bank for at least the next two years.
  • Twenty-one percent believe it’s time for their CEO to announce his or her retirement.
  • Thirty-one percent say their bank has designated a successor for the CEO. One-quarter have identified potential successors.
  • Nearly one-third indicate their board conducts an annual evaluation.
  • Forty-one percent have a mandatory retirement policy in place for directors. The median retirement age is 75—an increase from 72, as reported three years ago.
  • Forty-seven percent indicate their board is working to recruit younger directors. The median age of the youngest director serving on responding boards is 48.
  • Seventy-two percent say their directors receive a board meeting fee, at a median of $900 per meeting. Sixty-nine percent pay an annual cash retainer, at a median of $20,000.
  • Forty-three percent say that tying compensation to performance is a top compensation challenge facing their institution, followed by managing compensation and benefit costs (37 percent) and recruiting commercial lenders (36 percent).

To view the full results of the survey, click here.

Review Your Director Equity Plans

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equity-4-17-19.pngOutside director compensation has been on the minds of shareholders and compensation committees after a 2017 court decision and a continuing focus of proxy advisory firms that recommend how institutional investors vote on matters presented to public company stockholders.

In late 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a decision involving claims of excessive nonemployee director compensation at Investors Bancorp, a Short Hills, New Jersey-based bank. In that case, the court applied a higher legal standard to decisions made by directors about their own compensation.

Since the 2017 decision, other cases have been settled involving similar claims against public companies, and more new cases were filed in 2018. The two primary proxy advisory firms have also shown an enhanced focus since the 2017 decision on compensation awarded to outside directors.

With these cases in mind, focus on outside director compensation continues, and public companies especially should review their decision-making processes about discretionary stock equity plans and non-employee director compensation.

Stockholder claims concerning the conduct of directors generally are subject to review under the business judgment rule, where the presumption is that the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis and in the best interests of stockholders.

In cases where the business judgment rule applies, the court will not second-guess a board’s business decision.

Before the Investors Bancorp decision, this was the standard applied to cases challenging director compensation decisions, with a few exceptions. In the cases where the Delaware courts reviewed challenges to director compensation approved by directors themselves, the courts recognized a stockholder ratification defense for director compensation in cases in which stockholders had approved the following:

  • An equity plan that provides for fixed awards
  • The specific awards made under an equity plan
  • An equity plan that includes “self-executing” provisions—awards that are determined based on a formula specified in the plan without further discretion by the directors
  • An equity plan that includes “meaningful limits” on director compensation—a cap on the awards that could be made to nonemployee directors

In cases where a company can take advantage of the stockholder ratification defense, the company can seek dismissal of the stockholder claim under the business judgment rule.

In the Investors Bancorp case, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the scope of stockholder ratification of director compensation decisions for the first time in more than 50 years, and in doing so limited the ratification defense when directors make equity awards to themselves under an equity incentive plan.

The Delaware court determined that the more onerous rule—the “entire fairness” test—applies, where a plaintiff can show a majority of the board was interested or lacked independence regarding the decision, or would receive a personal financial benefit from the decision.

For equity grants awarded to directors under the plan, that test requires the board to prove equity incentive awards they grant themselves are fair to the company and its stockholders. The Delaware court found that while the stockholders in the Investors Bancorp case had approved the general parameters of the equity plan that contained a limit on the aggregate amount of stock awards that could be made to directors, they had not ratified the specific awards to directors and, therefore, the business judgment rule did not apply.

The decision therefore calls into question whether the ratification defense is still feasible for plans that contain only “meaningful limits” on director awards. The Delaware Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower court to review under the entire fairness standard, and that case is currently pending.

Key Takeaways
Boards and compensation committees should consider the following to mitigate potential risks in implementing equity incentive plans or making awards to directors under existing equity incentive plans:

  • Careful consideration of peer group selection
  • Retention of a compensation consultant experienced in banking
  • Whether to include director compensation limits in equity plans
  • Ensuring that director compensation decisions are made after a robust process that accounts for market practices and peer group practices

And finally, boards and compensation committees should carefully describe the decision-making process and other key factors for equity awards to nonemployee directors in the company’s annual proxy statement.

2018 Compensation Survey: Board Composition a Key Issue

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compensation-6-4-18.pngAn effective board starts with having the right members, making board composition a key issue for today’s banking industry. Forty-five percent of the directors and executives responding to Bank Director’s 2018 Compensation Survey, sponsored by Compensation Advisors, a member of Meyer-Chatfield Group, say that developing a board succession plan is a top challenge related to board composition, followed by the recruitment of tech-savvy directors, at 44 percent.

More than 200 chief executive officers, human resources officers, senior executives and board members participated in the survey, conducted in March and April 2018, which examines the talent challenges faced by the banking industry. The survey also includes data collected from proxy statements to reveal how—and how much—CEOs, directors and chairmen were compensated in fiscal year 2017.

Thirty-five percent of respondents cite the recruitment of female directors as a top board challenge, an area where the industry appears to have made some improvement. Seventy-seven percent of respondents indicate that their board has at least one female member, up from two-thirds last year. However, boards still have progress to make, with just 14 percent indicating that their board has three or more female members. And boards still struggle to represent diverse ethnic backgrounds—77 percent report that their board doesn’t have a single ethnically diverse director. They also need to gain more age-diverse views, with just 16 percent reporting they have a director who is aged 40 years old or younger.

Conducting an effective board evaluation—which rates the effectiveness of individual directors, as well as the board—is cited by 42 percent as a top governance challenge. Board evaluations are often touted as effective tools to fuel board diversity efforts, because they identify ineffective directors and help push them out of the boardroom, leaving empty seats to be filled with the skill sets, expertise and backgrounds needed by today’s board.

Other key findings:

  • Commercial lenders remain in high demand, cited by 68 percent of respondents as an area where they expect to actively recruit employees in 2018, followed by technology, at 38 percent.
  • Forty-seven percent indicate their bank has increased salaries over the past three years to attract younger talent. Twenty-seven percent offer more equity compensation or profit-sharing incentives.
  • Forty-four percent indicate their bank has dedicated more resources to train young employees. Overall, 80 percent offer external training as a benefit to employees, and 74 percent say their bank has an in-house training program.
  • The median age of a bank CEO is 58 years old. The median CEO salary in FY 2017 was $370,232, with total compensation at $621,000.
  • Paying board members appears to be a low-level concern: Just 14 percent indicate that offering a competitive director compensation package is a top challenge faced by the board.
  • Seventy percent of non-executive chairmen and outside directors receive a meeting fee, at a median of $1,000 per board meeting in FY 2017. More than three-quarters of non-executive chairmen, and 71 percent of outside directors, receive an annual retainer, at a median of $35,000 and $24,000, respectively.
  • Fifty-one percent most recently increased director compensation in 2017 or 2018, and one-quarter raised director pay in 2016.

To view the full results to the survey, click here.

Preparing for Challenges to Director Equity Compensation

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compensation-7-31-17.pngOne of the most difficult fiduciary issues facing boards is director compensation, since it is essentially and unavoidably a self-dealing transaction. The trend in recent years has been to increase the amount and proportion of director compensation that is comprised of equity. However, director stock compensation has also developed as a new frontier in stockholder litigation, and in response to successful challenges from stockholders to equity pay that has been viewed as excessive, several companies have been forced to modify director pay practices, including Facebook.

When challenged, board decisions are usually entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule, and will be dismissed unless the stockholder challenger can produce evidence of director bad faith or gross negligence. However, because directors have an interest in their decision as to their own compensation, business judgment protection is unavailable, and the burden is placed on the board to demonstrate that the award of compensation was fair, which means that stockholder challenges will rarely be dismissed at the pleadings stage.

Recent Delaware court decisions have provided important guidance for companies in terms of structuring equity compensation programs for directors. Directors can avail themselves of the protection of the business judgment rule, and challenges to director equity compensation will be dismissed under Delaware law, if disinterested stockholders have approved the payment of equity compensation for directors based on a fully informed and uncoerced vote. If the business judgment rule applies, a board’s decision as to its own compensation will be upheld if it can be attributed to any rational business purpose. As these court decisions further explain, however, not all stockholder approval is of equal effect.

In the 2014 lawsuit Calma v. Templeton, the board of software company Citrix Systems had annually awarded directors individual equity compensation of $250,000 to $350,000, in addition to annual cash compensation, over a multi-year period in accordance with the terms of a stockholder-approved equity plan. The equity plan allowed directors to participate in a plan to distribute up to 16 million shares as options, restricted stock awards, or restricted stock units (RSUs), of which up to 11 million shares could be awarded as RSUs, and authorized the compensation committee at its discretion to make all determinations with respect to awards granted, including to directors. The only limitation contained in the plan as to individual awards related to IRC Section 162m, and provided that no individual could receive more than 1 million shares in any one calendar year. The limit had an aggregate value of $55 million at the time of the litigation. The plaintiff claimed that the stock compensation paid to the directors, when combined with the annual cash compensation, was excessive, in breach of the board’s fiduciary duties. The Delaware Chancery Court declined to apply the business judgment rule and dismiss the stockholder challenge based on stockholder approval of the plan because the plan did not include any meaningful limit “bearing specifically on the magnitude of compensation to be paid” to the non-employee directors. The generic individual limit was insufficient for this purpose. The company settled the case, imposed annual dollar limits on the value of equity that annually could be granted to directors, and agreed to pay up to $425,000 to plaintiff’s counsel.

In another case, the Delaware Chancery Court this year dismissed a challenge to equity awards made to directors at Short Hills, New Jersey-based Investors Bancorp, which the court acknowledged were “quite large,” but which were made in accordance with the terms of the stockholder approved plan that included director-specific limits. Following stockholder approval of a stock benefit plan, the board of directors of the $23 billion asset Investors Bancorp had granted stock options and restricted stock awards to directors having an aggregate grant date value of approximately $2 million, which vested predominantly over a five-year period. The court noted that the compensation committee followed a diligent process involving four meetings and included input from an independent compensation consultant. The plan allowed for up to 30 million shares to be granted to officers, employees and directors. Of these shares, up to 17 million could be granted as stock options, and up to 13 million shares could be granted as restricted stock awards and RSUs. Importantly, the plan stipulated that no more than 30 percent of the shares reserved for issuance as stock options or restricted stock awards could be granted to outside directors, all of which could be granted in any one year. The court noted that this limit was unlike the “generic” limit for all beneficiaries found in the Citrix case, and that the plan meaningfully informed stockholders of the magnitude of the stock compensation that could be granted to directors.